Equity in the workforce
Comments
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Nothing like On the Job Training with very relaxed recruiting standards. I blame Trump.
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At least we have a highly competent Transportation Secretary
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I heard he was an expert on the Nation's transportation infrastructure just like Hunter was an expert on the Ukrainian oil and gas industry.RaceBannon said:At least we have a highly competent Transportation Secretary
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He's highly qualified. Ask our muh credentials expert.RaceBannon said:At least we have a highly competent Transportation Secretary
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When you made it a policy to not even interview former pilots or controllers that where WHITE and MALE, what do you expect.
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There has been a bunch of close calls lately.... fing scarry
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My brother recently retired from being a airline pilot, buddy is an airline pilot with a few years left. The people they are bringing in are BAD. Especially at the regional airline level. He said just yesterday "don't fly if you don't have to"? He is the top training guy at a major airline and an FAA designee and does the check rides and certs. Glad I like to travel by RV! My buddy is a Marine aviator flew Harriers for years saw heavy combat in the Gulf war and then Bosnia, He's been flying since he was 15 or 16 when we were in high school.
Recent certification the female pilot asks the other pilot to take over and says "I can't multi-task"! Not a good thing for a pilot. -
Lots of pilots are hitting forced retirement age (65) over the next few years so airlines are looking for anything to keep the pipeline full. Current pilots just got an 18% raise to keep them with their company.
I won't name the airline (but it's based in Atlanta and rhymes with Schmelta) hired a pilot who failed nine checkrides. Not exactly a sterling record there. -
Yikes
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"There's that word again 'competent'. It's clearly a conservative term."
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Showing up on time.
Hard work
Self reliance
Respect authority
Delaying gratification
Merit based standards
All signs of white supremacy. -
It's a problematic sign of white supremacy.hardhat said:"There's that word again 'competent'. It's clearly a conservative term."
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Some people are sayingUW_Doog_Bot said:
It's a problematic sign of white supremacy.hardhat said:"There's that word again 'competent'. It's clearly a conservative term."
Not us in the media mind you. But some people are saying -
"It seems like" is a great anecdotal approach to evaluating a system which has plenty of passenger safety statistics over a long period of time. It's nice that plane tracking and radar software is now accessible to the masses so these things can come to light and the system can continue to improve. However, I can also promise you runway conflicts forcing go-arounds occurred way before the past 3 years. Anecdotally. I've seen it. Is it worse statistically? I honestly don't know.
Hiring practices were an issue before COVID and aren't related to equity, whatever that means. Atlas Air 3591 is the clear example of this. An apparently qualified First Officer, getting through the hiring and training process, sending a 767 straight into the water because he can't maintain situational awareness. That rests with the system to identify in its hiring and training practices in the context of a labor shortage. I strongly doubt the system has been loosened to make it easier to get into a pilot seat in the past 3 years; hopefully the gaps identified through that disaster have been addressed.
https://admiralcloudberg.medium.com/legacy-of-a-lie-the-crash-of-atlas-air-flight-3591-519a3a7bd6ecIn an addendum to the report, NTSB Vice Chairman Bruce Landsberg chose to look at the big picture. If we focus on Aska’s human failings, on the legacy of his lie, we miss the real safety lessons. How many other pilots just like Conrad Jules Aska are out there right now, one accidental go-around mode activation away from disaster? The responsibility to keep them out of airline cockpits must lie with the system itself — and Landsberg believed that that system failed. Regarding the FAA’s long-delayed implementation of the pilot records database, he wrote, “I can see no good reason as to why it should have taken that long.” Addressing industry pushback, he added, “If you think monitoring, training or getting a solid background check on a prospective pilot candidate is expensive, try having an accident.”
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Quite honestly I don't disagreewhlinder said:"It seems like" is a great anecdotal approach to evaluating a system which has plenty of passenger safety statistics over a long period of time. It's nice that plane tracking and radar software is now accessible to the masses so these things can come to light and the system can continue to improve. However, I can also promise you runway conflicts forcing go-arounds occurred way before the past 3 years. Anecdotally. I've seen it. Is it worse statistically? I honestly don't know.
Hiring practices were an issue before COVID and aren't related to equity, whatever that means. Atlas Air 3591 is the clear example of this. An apparently qualified First Officer, getting through the hiring and training process, sending a 767 straight into the water because he can't maintain situational awareness. That rests with the system to identify in its hiring and training practices in the context of a labor shortage. I strongly doubt the system has been loosened to make it easier to get into a pilot seat in the past 3 years; hopefully the gaps identified through that disaster have been addressed.
https://admiralcloudberg.medium.com/legacy-of-a-lie-the-crash-of-atlas-air-flight-3591-519a3a7bd6ecIn an addendum to the report, NTSB Vice Chairman Bruce Landsberg chose to look at the big picture. If we focus on Aska’s human failings, on the legacy of his lie, we miss the real safety lessons. How many other pilots just like Conrad Jules Aska are out there right now, one accidental go-around mode activation away from disaster? The responsibility to keep them out of airline cockpits must lie with the system itself — and Landsberg believed that that system failed. Regarding the FAA’s long-delayed implementation of the pilot records database, he wrote, “I can see no good reason as to why it should have taken that long.” Addressing industry pushback, he added, “If you think monitoring, training or getting a solid background check on a prospective pilot candidate is expensive, try having an accident.”
Covid with a side of mandates probably culled the herd. Lot of industries are playing catch up. Like construction. It's pathetic these days.
Wasn't Teneriffe a runway collision? In the 70s
Anyway my weekly flights to Spokane are done for now. So I'm good -
Teneriffe was the worst ever a KLM 747 slammed into a Pan Am 747 in dense fog and tjwy were only there due to a terrorist act at La Palma... it cleared up so then the planes were flying to there and the KLM pilot was in too big a hurry. A few survived on Pan Am amazingly. Very sad.RaceBannon said:
Quite honestly I don't disagreewhlinder said:"It seems like" is a great anecdotal approach to evaluating a system which has plenty of passenger safety statistics over a long period of time. It's nice that plane tracking and radar software is now accessible to the masses so these things can come to light and the system can continue to improve. However, I can also promise you runway conflicts forcing go-arounds occurred way before the past 3 years. Anecdotally. I've seen it. Is it worse statistically? I honestly don't know.
Hiring practices were an issue before COVID and aren't related to equity, whatever that means. Atlas Air 3591 is the clear example of this. An apparently qualified First Officer, getting through the hiring and training process, sending a 767 straight into the water because he can't maintain situational awareness. That rests with the system to identify in its hiring and training practices in the context of a labor shortage. I strongly doubt the system has been loosened to make it easier to get into a pilot seat in the past 3 years; hopefully the gaps identified through that disaster have been addressed.
https://admiralcloudberg.medium.com/legacy-of-a-lie-the-crash-of-atlas-air-flight-3591-519a3a7bd6ecIn an addendum to the report, NTSB Vice Chairman Bruce Landsberg chose to look at the big picture. If we focus on Aska’s human failings, on the legacy of his lie, we miss the real safety lessons. How many other pilots just like Conrad Jules Aska are out there right now, one accidental go-around mode activation away from disaster? The responsibility to keep them out of airline cockpits must lie with the system itself — and Landsberg believed that that system failed. Regarding the FAA’s long-delayed implementation of the pilot records database, he wrote, “I can see no good reason as to why it should have taken that long.” Addressing industry pushback, he added, “If you think monitoring, training or getting a solid background check on a prospective pilot candidate is expensive, try having an accident.”
Covid with a side of mandates probably culled the herd. Lot of industries are playing catch up. Like construction. It's pathetic these days.
Wasn't Teneriffe a runway collision? In the 70s
Anyway my weekly flights to Spokane are done for now. So I'm good -
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RAT approved and promoted child abuse.Swaye said: -
Yes Tenerife was in the mid-70s. Terrible event but needed like 30 things to go wrong for that to happen. Far more relevant was the LAX runway crash in the 90s where the controller basically forgot that a prop plane was told to taxi onto the runway and hold while a 737 was cleared to land. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Los_Angeles_runway_disasterRaceBannon said:
Quite honestly I don't disagreewhlinder said:"It seems like" is a great anecdotal approach to evaluating a system which has plenty of passenger safety statistics over a long period of time. It's nice that plane tracking and radar software is now accessible to the masses so these things can come to light and the system can continue to improve. However, I can also promise you runway conflicts forcing go-arounds occurred way before the past 3 years. Anecdotally. I've seen it. Is it worse statistically? I honestly don't know.
Hiring practices were an issue before COVID and aren't related to equity, whatever that means. Atlas Air 3591 is the clear example of this. An apparently qualified First Officer, getting through the hiring and training process, sending a 767 straight into the water because he can't maintain situational awareness. That rests with the system to identify in its hiring and training practices in the context of a labor shortage. I strongly doubt the system has been loosened to make it easier to get into a pilot seat in the past 3 years; hopefully the gaps identified through that disaster have been addressed.
https://admiralcloudberg.medium.com/legacy-of-a-lie-the-crash-of-atlas-air-flight-3591-519a3a7bd6ecIn an addendum to the report, NTSB Vice Chairman Bruce Landsberg chose to look at the big picture. If we focus on Aska’s human failings, on the legacy of his lie, we miss the real safety lessons. How many other pilots just like Conrad Jules Aska are out there right now, one accidental go-around mode activation away from disaster? The responsibility to keep them out of airline cockpits must lie with the system itself — and Landsberg believed that that system failed. Regarding the FAA’s long-delayed implementation of the pilot records database, he wrote, “I can see no good reason as to why it should have taken that long.” Addressing industry pushback, he added, “If you think monitoring, training or getting a solid background check on a prospective pilot candidate is expensive, try having an accident.”
Covid with a side of mandates probably culled the herd. Lot of industries are playing catch up. Like construction. It's pathetic these days.
Wasn't Teneriffe a runway collision? In the 70s
Anyway my weekly flights to Spokane are done for now. So I'm good -
Delta just approved a 34% raise for their pilots.georgiaduck said:Lots of pilots are hitting forced retirement age (65) over the next few years so airlines are looking for anything to keep the pipeline full. Current pilots just got an 18% raise to keep them with their company.
I won't name the airline (but it's based in Atlanta and rhymes with Schmelta) hired a pilot who failed nine checkrides. Not exactly a sterling record there. -
Tenerife was a highly skilled senior 747 pilot deciding he was tired of waiting and just decided to roll in the fog without clearance.whlinder said:
Yes Tenerife was in the mid-70s. Terrible event but needed like 30 things to go wrong for that to happen. Far more relevant was the LAX runway crash in the 90s where the controller basically forgot that a prop plane was told to taxi onto the runway and hold while a 737 was cleared to land. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Los_Angeles_runway_disasterRaceBannon said:
Quite honestly I don't disagreewhlinder said:"It seems like" is a great anecdotal approach to evaluating a system which has plenty of passenger safety statistics over a long period of time. It's nice that plane tracking and radar software is now accessible to the masses so these things can come to light and the system can continue to improve. However, I can also promise you runway conflicts forcing go-arounds occurred way before the past 3 years. Anecdotally. I've seen it. Is it worse statistically? I honestly don't know.
Hiring practices were an issue before COVID and aren't related to equity, whatever that means. Atlas Air 3591 is the clear example of this. An apparently qualified First Officer, getting through the hiring and training process, sending a 767 straight into the water because he can't maintain situational awareness. That rests with the system to identify in its hiring and training practices in the context of a labor shortage. I strongly doubt the system has been loosened to make it easier to get into a pilot seat in the past 3 years; hopefully the gaps identified through that disaster have been addressed.
https://admiralcloudberg.medium.com/legacy-of-a-lie-the-crash-of-atlas-air-flight-3591-519a3a7bd6ecIn an addendum to the report, NTSB Vice Chairman Bruce Landsberg chose to look at the big picture. If we focus on Aska’s human failings, on the legacy of his lie, we miss the real safety lessons. How many other pilots just like Conrad Jules Aska are out there right now, one accidental go-around mode activation away from disaster? The responsibility to keep them out of airline cockpits must lie with the system itself — and Landsberg believed that that system failed. Regarding the FAA’s long-delayed implementation of the pilot records database, he wrote, “I can see no good reason as to why it should have taken that long.” Addressing industry pushback, he added, “If you think monitoring, training or getting a solid background check on a prospective pilot candidate is expensive, try having an accident.”
Covid with a side of mandates probably culled the herd. Lot of industries are playing catch up. Like construction. It's pathetic these days.
Wasn't Teneriffe a runway collision? In the 70s
Anyway my weekly flights to Spokane are done for now. So I'm good -
Yes, in the 1970s before crew resource management was a thing.46XiJCAB said:
Tenerife was a highly skilled senior 747 pilot deciding he was tired of waiting and just decided to roll in the fog without clearance.whlinder said:
Yes Tenerife was in the mid-70s. Terrible event but needed like 30 things to go wrong for that to happen. Far more relevant was the LAX runway crash in the 90s where the controller basically forgot that a prop plane was told to taxi onto the runway and hold while a 737 was cleared to land. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Los_Angeles_runway_disasterRaceBannon said:
Quite honestly I don't disagreewhlinder said:"It seems like" is a great anecdotal approach to evaluating a system which has plenty of passenger safety statistics over a long period of time. It's nice that plane tracking and radar software is now accessible to the masses so these things can come to light and the system can continue to improve. However, I can also promise you runway conflicts forcing go-arounds occurred way before the past 3 years. Anecdotally. I've seen it. Is it worse statistically? I honestly don't know.
Hiring practices were an issue before COVID and aren't related to equity, whatever that means. Atlas Air 3591 is the clear example of this. An apparently qualified First Officer, getting through the hiring and training process, sending a 767 straight into the water because he can't maintain situational awareness. That rests with the system to identify in its hiring and training practices in the context of a labor shortage. I strongly doubt the system has been loosened to make it easier to get into a pilot seat in the past 3 years; hopefully the gaps identified through that disaster have been addressed.
https://admiralcloudberg.medium.com/legacy-of-a-lie-the-crash-of-atlas-air-flight-3591-519a3a7bd6ecIn an addendum to the report, NTSB Vice Chairman Bruce Landsberg chose to look at the big picture. If we focus on Aska’s human failings, on the legacy of his lie, we miss the real safety lessons. How many other pilots just like Conrad Jules Aska are out there right now, one accidental go-around mode activation away from disaster? The responsibility to keep them out of airline cockpits must lie with the system itself — and Landsberg believed that that system failed. Regarding the FAA’s long-delayed implementation of the pilot records database, he wrote, “I can see no good reason as to why it should have taken that long.” Addressing industry pushback, he added, “If you think monitoring, training or getting a solid background check on a prospective pilot candidate is expensive, try having an accident.”
Covid with a side of mandates probably culled the herd. Lot of industries are playing catch up. Like construction. It's pathetic these days.
Wasn't Teneriffe a runway collision? In the 70s
Anyway my weekly flights to Spokane are done for now. So I'm good
He was KLM’s chief pilot. The training standards and technical infrastructure of that era are way behind today.
And it still doesn’t happen if not for 20 other coincidences. Ultimately he fucked up but the contributing factors to that disaster are off the charts.
In the 2020s go-arounds and aborted takeoffs make almost as much news as disasters did 30+ years ago. -
I've been on two aborted landings due to traffic on the runway. Neither I'm sure made the news. One in Philadelphia the other San Francisco. The one in SF I thought was the end. A DC-10 aborting a landing over the runway makes you appreciate a good pilot and the structural integrity and power of a modern airliner.whlinder said:
Yes, in the 1970s before crew resource management was a thing.46XiJCAB said:
Tenerife was a highly skilled senior 747 pilot deciding he was tired of waiting and just decided to roll in the fog without clearance.whlinder said:
Yes Tenerife was in the mid-70s. Terrible event but needed like 30 things to go wrong for that to happen. Far more relevant was the LAX runway crash in the 90s where the controller basically forgot that a prop plane was told to taxi onto the runway and hold while a 737 was cleared to land. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Los_Angeles_runway_disasterRaceBannon said:
Quite honestly I don't disagreewhlinder said:"It seems like" is a great anecdotal approach to evaluating a system which has plenty of passenger safety statistics over a long period of time. It's nice that plane tracking and radar software is now accessible to the masses so these things can come to light and the system can continue to improve. However, I can also promise you runway conflicts forcing go-arounds occurred way before the past 3 years. Anecdotally. I've seen it. Is it worse statistically? I honestly don't know.
Hiring practices were an issue before COVID and aren't related to equity, whatever that means. Atlas Air 3591 is the clear example of this. An apparently qualified First Officer, getting through the hiring and training process, sending a 767 straight into the water because he can't maintain situational awareness. That rests with the system to identify in its hiring and training practices in the context of a labor shortage. I strongly doubt the system has been loosened to make it easier to get into a pilot seat in the past 3 years; hopefully the gaps identified through that disaster have been addressed.
https://admiralcloudberg.medium.com/legacy-of-a-lie-the-crash-of-atlas-air-flight-3591-519a3a7bd6ecIn an addendum to the report, NTSB Vice Chairman Bruce Landsberg chose to look at the big picture. If we focus on Aska’s human failings, on the legacy of his lie, we miss the real safety lessons. How many other pilots just like Conrad Jules Aska are out there right now, one accidental go-around mode activation away from disaster? The responsibility to keep them out of airline cockpits must lie with the system itself — and Landsberg believed that that system failed. Regarding the FAA’s long-delayed implementation of the pilot records database, he wrote, “I can see no good reason as to why it should have taken that long.” Addressing industry pushback, he added, “If you think monitoring, training or getting a solid background check on a prospective pilot candidate is expensive, try having an accident.”
Covid with a side of mandates probably culled the herd. Lot of industries are playing catch up. Like construction. It's pathetic these days.
Wasn't Teneriffe a runway collision? In the 70s
Anyway my weekly flights to Spokane are done for now. So I'm good
He was KLM’s chief pilot. The training standards and technical infrastructure of that era are way behind today.
And it still doesn’t happen if not for 20 other coincidences. Ultimately he fucked up but the contributing factors to that disaster are off the charts.
In the 2020s go-arounds and aborted takeoffs make almost as much news as disasters did 30+ years ago.
The recent revelations about hiring practices for air traffic controllers and pilots has me more concerned for the future. I see it getting worse. -
That's too bad because the Throbber would have treated you to the finest meats and cheeses and hookers and blow East Sprague could provide.RaceBannon said:
Quite honestly I don't disagreewhlinder said:"It seems like" is a great anecdotal approach to evaluating a system which has plenty of passenger safety statistics over a long period of time. It's nice that plane tracking and radar software is now accessible to the masses so these things can come to light and the system can continue to improve. However, I can also promise you runway conflicts forcing go-arounds occurred way before the past 3 years. Anecdotally. I've seen it. Is it worse statistically? I honestly don't know.
Hiring practices were an issue before COVID and aren't related to equity, whatever that means. Atlas Air 3591 is the clear example of this. An apparently qualified First Officer, getting through the hiring and training process, sending a 767 straight into the water because he can't maintain situational awareness. That rests with the system to identify in its hiring and training practices in the context of a labor shortage. I strongly doubt the system has been loosened to make it easier to get into a pilot seat in the past 3 years; hopefully the gaps identified through that disaster have been addressed.
https://admiralcloudberg.medium.com/legacy-of-a-lie-the-crash-of-atlas-air-flight-3591-519a3a7bd6ecIn an addendum to the report, NTSB Vice Chairman Bruce Landsberg chose to look at the big picture. If we focus on Aska’s human failings, on the legacy of his lie, we miss the real safety lessons. How many other pilots just like Conrad Jules Aska are out there right now, one accidental go-around mode activation away from disaster? The responsibility to keep them out of airline cockpits must lie with the system itself — and Landsberg believed that that system failed. Regarding the FAA’s long-delayed implementation of the pilot records database, he wrote, “I can see no good reason as to why it should have taken that long.” Addressing industry pushback, he added, “If you think monitoring, training or getting a solid background check on a prospective pilot candidate is expensive, try having an accident.”
Covid with a side of mandates probably culled the herd. Lot of industries are playing catch up. Like construction. It's pathetic these days.
Wasn't Teneriffe a runway collision? In the 70s
Anyway my weekly flights to Spokane are done for now. So I'm good
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Apparently you East siders are a bit soft. The owner was loving how I whipped the place into shape but grown ass men said I was mean. Behind my backPurpleThrobber said:
That's too bad because the Throbber would have treated you to the finest meats and cheeses and hookers and blow East Sprague could provide.RaceBannon said:
Quite honestly I don't disagreewhlinder said:"It seems like" is a great anecdotal approach to evaluating a system which has plenty of passenger safety statistics over a long period of time. It's nice that plane tracking and radar software is now accessible to the masses so these things can come to light and the system can continue to improve. However, I can also promise you runway conflicts forcing go-arounds occurred way before the past 3 years. Anecdotally. I've seen it. Is it worse statistically? I honestly don't know.
Hiring practices were an issue before COVID and aren't related to equity, whatever that means. Atlas Air 3591 is the clear example of this. An apparently qualified First Officer, getting through the hiring and training process, sending a 767 straight into the water because he can't maintain situational awareness. That rests with the system to identify in its hiring and training practices in the context of a labor shortage. I strongly doubt the system has been loosened to make it easier to get into a pilot seat in the past 3 years; hopefully the gaps identified through that disaster have been addressed.
https://admiralcloudberg.medium.com/legacy-of-a-lie-the-crash-of-atlas-air-flight-3591-519a3a7bd6ecIn an addendum to the report, NTSB Vice Chairman Bruce Landsberg chose to look at the big picture. If we focus on Aska’s human failings, on the legacy of his lie, we miss the real safety lessons. How many other pilots just like Conrad Jules Aska are out there right now, one accidental go-around mode activation away from disaster? The responsibility to keep them out of airline cockpits must lie with the system itself — and Landsberg believed that that system failed. Regarding the FAA’s long-delayed implementation of the pilot records database, he wrote, “I can see no good reason as to why it should have taken that long.” Addressing industry pushback, he added, “If you think monitoring, training or getting a solid background check on a prospective pilot candidate is expensive, try having an accident.”
Covid with a side of mandates probably culled the herd. Lot of industries are playing catch up. Like construction. It's pathetic these days.
Wasn't Teneriffe a runway collision? In the 70s
Anyway my weekly flights to Spokane are done for now. So I'm good
Always easier to fire the coach. Or move me to another fire. Back on the wet side -
I haven't seen anything about hiring practice changes; as I said before the system exists to ensure qualified pilots are identified and trained. The legislation 15 years ago to require 1500 flight hours ensures a higher level of experience amongst the application pool than at any point before that, while also contributing to the shortage.46XiJCAB said:
I've been on two aborted landings due to traffic on the runway. Neither I'm sure made the news. One in Philadelphia the other San Francisco. The one in SF I thought was the end. A DC-10 aborting a landing over the runway makes you appreciate a good pilot and the structural integrity and power of a modern airliner.whlinder said:
Yes, in the 1970s before crew resource management was a thing.46XiJCAB said:
Tenerife was a highly skilled senior 747 pilot deciding he was tired of waiting and just decided to roll in the fog without clearance.whlinder said:
Yes Tenerife was in the mid-70s. Terrible event but needed like 30 things to go wrong for that to happen. Far more relevant was the LAX runway crash in the 90s where the controller basically forgot that a prop plane was told to taxi onto the runway and hold while a 737 was cleared to land. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Los_Angeles_runway_disasterRaceBannon said:
Quite honestly I don't disagreewhlinder said:"It seems like" is a great anecdotal approach to evaluating a system which has plenty of passenger safety statistics over a long period of time. It's nice that plane tracking and radar software is now accessible to the masses so these things can come to light and the system can continue to improve. However, I can also promise you runway conflicts forcing go-arounds occurred way before the past 3 years. Anecdotally. I've seen it. Is it worse statistically? I honestly don't know.
Hiring practices were an issue before COVID and aren't related to equity, whatever that means. Atlas Air 3591 is the clear example of this. An apparently qualified First Officer, getting through the hiring and training process, sending a 767 straight into the water because he can't maintain situational awareness. That rests with the system to identify in its hiring and training practices in the context of a labor shortage. I strongly doubt the system has been loosened to make it easier to get into a pilot seat in the past 3 years; hopefully the gaps identified through that disaster have been addressed.
https://admiralcloudberg.medium.com/legacy-of-a-lie-the-crash-of-atlas-air-flight-3591-519a3a7bd6ecIn an addendum to the report, NTSB Vice Chairman Bruce Landsberg chose to look at the big picture. If we focus on Aska’s human failings, on the legacy of his lie, we miss the real safety lessons. How many other pilots just like Conrad Jules Aska are out there right now, one accidental go-around mode activation away from disaster? The responsibility to keep them out of airline cockpits must lie with the system itself — and Landsberg believed that that system failed. Regarding the FAA’s long-delayed implementation of the pilot records database, he wrote, “I can see no good reason as to why it should have taken that long.” Addressing industry pushback, he added, “If you think monitoring, training or getting a solid background check on a prospective pilot candidate is expensive, try having an accident.”
Covid with a side of mandates probably culled the herd. Lot of industries are playing catch up. Like construction. It's pathetic these days.
Wasn't Teneriffe a runway collision? In the 70s
Anyway my weekly flights to Spokane are done for now. So I'm good
He was KLM’s chief pilot. The training standards and technical infrastructure of that era are way behind today.
And it still doesn’t happen if not for 20 other coincidences. Ultimately he fucked up but the contributing factors to that disaster are off the charts.
In the 2020s go-arounds and aborted takeoffs make almost as much news as disasters did 30+ years ago.
The recent revelations about hiring practices for air traffic controllers and pilots has me more concerned for the future. I see it getting worse.
ATC hiring may be a different story; I've heard some staffing anecdotes there but the ATC is constrained by technology at this point.
I've had my share of aborted landings too. Aircraft are built incredibly well except when Boeing decides to fuck up their software. I feel completely safe on commercial aircraft virtually anywhere in the world. (Intra-Africa travel is something). -
Fuck me opening this thread while flying home from Detroit.
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You heard about the co-pilot who crashed the Amazon Prime 767 into a Houston lake on approach? Tragic that he was at the controls of an aircraft.whlinder said:
I haven't seen anything about hiring practice changes; as I said before the system exists to ensure qualified pilots are identified and trained. The legislation 15 years ago to require 1500 flight hours ensures a higher level of experience amongst the application pool than at any point before that, while also contributing to the shortage.46XiJCAB said:
I've been on two aborted landings due to traffic on the runway. Neither I'm sure made the news. One in Philadelphia the other San Francisco. The one in SF I thought was the end. A DC-10 aborting a landing over the runway makes you appreciate a good pilot and the structural integrity and power of a modern airliner.whlinder said:
Yes, in the 1970s before crew resource management was a thing.46XiJCAB said:
Tenerife was a highly skilled senior 747 pilot deciding he was tired of waiting and just decided to roll in the fog without clearance.whlinder said:
Yes Tenerife was in the mid-70s. Terrible event but needed like 30 things to go wrong for that to happen. Far more relevant was the LAX runway crash in the 90s where the controller basically forgot that a prop plane was told to taxi onto the runway and hold while a 737 was cleared to land. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Los_Angeles_runway_disasterRaceBannon said:
Quite honestly I don't disagreewhlinder said:"It seems like" is a great anecdotal approach to evaluating a system which has plenty of passenger safety statistics over a long period of time. It's nice that plane tracking and radar software is now accessible to the masses so these things can come to light and the system can continue to improve. However, I can also promise you runway conflicts forcing go-arounds occurred way before the past 3 years. Anecdotally. I've seen it. Is it worse statistically? I honestly don't know.
Hiring practices were an issue before COVID and aren't related to equity, whatever that means. Atlas Air 3591 is the clear example of this. An apparently qualified First Officer, getting through the hiring and training process, sending a 767 straight into the water because he can't maintain situational awareness. That rests with the system to identify in its hiring and training practices in the context of a labor shortage. I strongly doubt the system has been loosened to make it easier to get into a pilot seat in the past 3 years; hopefully the gaps identified through that disaster have been addressed.
https://admiralcloudberg.medium.com/legacy-of-a-lie-the-crash-of-atlas-air-flight-3591-519a3a7bd6ecIn an addendum to the report, NTSB Vice Chairman Bruce Landsberg chose to look at the big picture. If we focus on Aska’s human failings, on the legacy of his lie, we miss the real safety lessons. How many other pilots just like Conrad Jules Aska are out there right now, one accidental go-around mode activation away from disaster? The responsibility to keep them out of airline cockpits must lie with the system itself — and Landsberg believed that that system failed. Regarding the FAA’s long-delayed implementation of the pilot records database, he wrote, “I can see no good reason as to why it should have taken that long.” Addressing industry pushback, he added, “If you think monitoring, training or getting a solid background check on a prospective pilot candidate is expensive, try having an accident.”
Covid with a side of mandates probably culled the herd. Lot of industries are playing catch up. Like construction. It's pathetic these days.
Wasn't Teneriffe a runway collision? In the 70s
Anyway my weekly flights to Spokane are done for now. So I'm good
He was KLM’s chief pilot. The training standards and technical infrastructure of that era are way behind today.
And it still doesn’t happen if not for 20 other coincidences. Ultimately he fucked up but the contributing factors to that disaster are off the charts.
In the 2020s go-arounds and aborted takeoffs make almost as much news as disasters did 30+ years ago.
The recent revelations about hiring practices for air traffic controllers and pilots has me more concerned for the future. I see it getting worse.
ATC hiring may be a different story; I've heard some staffing anecdotes there but the ATC is constrained by technology at this point.
I've had my share of aborted landings too. Aircraft are built incredibly well except when Boeing decides to fuck up their software. I feel completely safe on commercial aircraft virtually anywhere in the world. (Intra-Africa travel is something). -
So glad medical schools are eroding silly standards like test scores to satisfy equity requirements. If I'm under the knife or undergoing cancer treatment, I don't care about merit, equity is much more important.SFGbob said:Showing up on time.
Hard work
Self reliance
Respect authority
Delaying gratification
Merit based standards
All signs of white supremacy.
