Lots of pilots are hitting forced retirement age (65) over the next few years so airlines are looking for anything to keep the pipeline full. Current pilots just got an 18% raise to keep them with their company.
I won't name the airline (but it's based in Atlanta and rhymes with Schmelta) hired a pilot who failed nine checkrides. Not exactly a sterling record there.
"It seems like" is a great anecdotal approach to evaluating a system which has plenty of passenger safety statistics over a long period of time. It's nice that plane tracking and radar software is now accessible to the masses so these things can come to light and the system can continue to improve. However, I can also promise you runway conflicts forcing go-arounds occurred way before the past 3 years. Anecdotally. I've seen it. Is it worse statistically? I honestly don't know.
Hiring practices were an issue before COVID and aren't related to equity, whatever that means. Atlas Air 3591 is the clear example of this. An apparently qualified First Officer, getting through the hiring and training process, sending a 767 straight into the water because he can't maintain situational awareness. That rests with the system to identify in its hiring and training practices in the context of a labor shortage. I strongly doubt the system has been loosened to make it easier to get into a pilot seat in the past 3 years; hopefully the gaps identified through that disaster have been addressed.
In an addendum to the report, NTSB Vice Chairman Bruce Landsberg chose to look at the big picture. If we focus on Aska’s human failings, on the legacy of his lie, we miss the real safety lessons. How many other pilots just like Conrad Jules Aska are out there right now, one accidental go-around mode activation away from disaster? The responsibility to keep them out of airline cockpits must lie with the system itself — and Landsberg believed that that system failed. Regarding the FAA’s long-delayed implementation of the pilot records database, he wrote, “I can see no good reason as to why it should have taken that long.” Addressing industry pushback, he added, “If you think monitoring, training or getting a solid background check on a prospective pilot candidate is expensive, try having an accident.”
Quite honestly I don't disagree
Covid with a side of mandates probably culled the herd. Lot of industries are playing catch up. Like construction. It's pathetic these days.
Wasn't Teneriffe a runway collision? In the 70s
Anyway my weekly flights to Spokane are done for now. So I'm good
Yes Tenerife was in the mid-70s. Terrible event but needed like 30 things to go wrong for that to happen. Far more relevant was the LAX runway crash in the 90s where the controller basically forgot that a prop plane was told to taxi onto the runway and hold while a 737 was cleared to land. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Los_Angeles_runway_disaster
Tenerife was a highly skilled senior 747 pilot deciding he was tired of waiting and just decided to roll in the fog without clearance.
"It seems like" is a great anecdotal approach to evaluating a system which has plenty of passenger safety statistics over a long period of time. It's nice that plane tracking and radar software is now accessible to the masses so these things can come to light and the system can continue to improve. However, I can also promise you runway conflicts forcing go-arounds occurred way before the past 3 years. Anecdotally. I've seen it. Is it worse statistically? I honestly don't know.
Hiring practices were an issue before COVID and aren't related to equity, whatever that means. Atlas Air 3591 is the clear example of this. An apparently qualified First Officer, getting through the hiring and training process, sending a 767 straight into the water because he can't maintain situational awareness. That rests with the system to identify in its hiring and training practices in the context of a labor shortage. I strongly doubt the system has been loosened to make it easier to get into a pilot seat in the past 3 years; hopefully the gaps identified through that disaster have been addressed.
In an addendum to the report, NTSB Vice Chairman Bruce Landsberg chose to look at the big picture. If we focus on Aska’s human failings, on the legacy of his lie, we miss the real safety lessons. How many other pilots just like Conrad Jules Aska are out there right now, one accidental go-around mode activation away from disaster? The responsibility to keep them out of airline cockpits must lie with the system itself — and Landsberg believed that that system failed. Regarding the FAA’s long-delayed implementation of the pilot records database, he wrote, “I can see no good reason as to why it should have taken that long.” Addressing industry pushback, he added, “If you think monitoring, training or getting a solid background check on a prospective pilot candidate is expensive, try having an accident.”
Quite honestly I don't disagree
Covid with a side of mandates probably culled the herd. Lot of industries are playing catch up. Like construction. It's pathetic these days.
Wasn't Teneriffe a runway collision? In the 70s
Anyway my weekly flights to Spokane are done for now. So I'm good
Yes Tenerife was in the mid-70s. Terrible event but needed like 30 things to go wrong for that to happen. Far more relevant was the LAX runway crash in the 90s where the controller basically forgot that a prop plane was told to taxi onto the runway and hold while a 737 was cleared to land. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Los_Angeles_runway_disaster
Tenerife was a highly skilled senior 747 pilot deciding he was tired of waiting and just decided to roll in the fog without clearance.
Yes, in the 1970s before crew resource management was a thing.
He was KLM’s chief pilot. The training standards and technical infrastructure of that era are way behind today.
And it still doesn’t happen if not for 20 other coincidences. Ultimately he fucked up but the contributing factors to that disaster are off the charts.
In the 2020s go-arounds and aborted takeoffs make almost as much news as disasters did 30+ years ago.
"It seems like" is a great anecdotal approach to evaluating a system which has plenty of passenger safety statistics over a long period of time. It's nice that plane tracking and radar software is now accessible to the masses so these things can come to light and the system can continue to improve. However, I can also promise you runway conflicts forcing go-arounds occurred way before the past 3 years. Anecdotally. I've seen it. Is it worse statistically? I honestly don't know.
Hiring practices were an issue before COVID and aren't related to equity, whatever that means. Atlas Air 3591 is the clear example of this. An apparently qualified First Officer, getting through the hiring and training process, sending a 767 straight into the water because he can't maintain situational awareness. That rests with the system to identify in its hiring and training practices in the context of a labor shortage. I strongly doubt the system has been loosened to make it easier to get into a pilot seat in the past 3 years; hopefully the gaps identified through that disaster have been addressed.
In an addendum to the report, NTSB Vice Chairman Bruce Landsberg chose to look at the big picture. If we focus on Aska’s human failings, on the legacy of his lie, we miss the real safety lessons. How many other pilots just like Conrad Jules Aska are out there right now, one accidental go-around mode activation away from disaster? The responsibility to keep them out of airline cockpits must lie with the system itself — and Landsberg believed that that system failed. Regarding the FAA’s long-delayed implementation of the pilot records database, he wrote, “I can see no good reason as to why it should have taken that long.” Addressing industry pushback, he added, “If you think monitoring, training or getting a solid background check on a prospective pilot candidate is expensive, try having an accident.”
Quite honestly I don't disagree
Covid with a side of mandates probably culled the herd. Lot of industries are playing catch up. Like construction. It's pathetic these days.
Wasn't Teneriffe a runway collision? In the 70s
Anyway my weekly flights to Spokane are done for now. So I'm good
Yes Tenerife was in the mid-70s. Terrible event but needed like 30 things to go wrong for that to happen. Far more relevant was the LAX runway crash in the 90s where the controller basically forgot that a prop plane was told to taxi onto the runway and hold while a 737 was cleared to land. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Los_Angeles_runway_disaster
Tenerife was a highly skilled senior 747 pilot deciding he was tired of waiting and just decided to roll in the fog without clearance.
Yes, in the 1970s before crew resource management was a thing.
He was KLM’s chief pilot. The training standards and technical infrastructure of that era are way behind today.
And it still doesn’t happen if not for 20 other coincidences. Ultimately he fucked up but the contributing factors to that disaster are off the charts.
In the 2020s go-arounds and aborted takeoffs make almost as much news as disasters did 30+ years ago.
I've been on two aborted landings due to traffic on the runway. Neither I'm sure made the news. One in Philadelphia the other San Francisco. The one in SF I thought was the end. A DC-10 aborting a landing over the runway makes you appreciate a good pilot and the structural integrity and power of a modern airliner.
The recent revelations about hiring practices for air traffic controllers and pilots has me more concerned for the future. I see it getting worse.
"It seems like" is a great anecdotal approach to evaluating a system which has plenty of passenger safety statistics over a long period of time. It's nice that plane tracking and radar software is now accessible to the masses so these things can come to light and the system can continue to improve. However, I can also promise you runway conflicts forcing go-arounds occurred way before the past 3 years. Anecdotally. I've seen it. Is it worse statistically? I honestly don't know.
Hiring practices were an issue before COVID and aren't related to equity, whatever that means. Atlas Air 3591 is the clear example of this. An apparently qualified First Officer, getting through the hiring and training process, sending a 767 straight into the water because he can't maintain situational awareness. That rests with the system to identify in its hiring and training practices in the context of a labor shortage. I strongly doubt the system has been loosened to make it easier to get into a pilot seat in the past 3 years; hopefully the gaps identified through that disaster have been addressed.
In an addendum to the report, NTSB Vice Chairman Bruce Landsberg chose to look at the big picture. If we focus on Aska’s human failings, on the legacy of his lie, we miss the real safety lessons. How many other pilots just like Conrad Jules Aska are out there right now, one accidental go-around mode activation away from disaster? The responsibility to keep them out of airline cockpits must lie with the system itself — and Landsberg believed that that system failed. Regarding the FAA’s long-delayed implementation of the pilot records database, he wrote, “I can see no good reason as to why it should have taken that long.” Addressing industry pushback, he added, “If you think monitoring, training or getting a solid background check on a prospective pilot candidate is expensive, try having an accident.”
Quite honestly I don't disagree
Covid with a side of mandates probably culled the herd. Lot of industries are playing catch up. Like construction. It's pathetic these days.
Wasn't Teneriffe a runway collision? In the 70s
Anyway my weekly flights to Spokane are done for now. So I'm good
That's too bad because the Throbber would have treated you to the finest meats and cheeses and hookers and blow East Sprague could provide.
"It seems like" is a great anecdotal approach to evaluating a system which has plenty of passenger safety statistics over a long period of time. It's nice that plane tracking and radar software is now accessible to the masses so these things can come to light and the system can continue to improve. However, I can also promise you runway conflicts forcing go-arounds occurred way before the past 3 years. Anecdotally. I've seen it. Is it worse statistically? I honestly don't know.
Hiring practices were an issue before COVID and aren't related to equity, whatever that means. Atlas Air 3591 is the clear example of this. An apparently qualified First Officer, getting through the hiring and training process, sending a 767 straight into the water because he can't maintain situational awareness. That rests with the system to identify in its hiring and training practices in the context of a labor shortage. I strongly doubt the system has been loosened to make it easier to get into a pilot seat in the past 3 years; hopefully the gaps identified through that disaster have been addressed.
In an addendum to the report, NTSB Vice Chairman Bruce Landsberg chose to look at the big picture. If we focus on Aska’s human failings, on the legacy of his lie, we miss the real safety lessons. How many other pilots just like Conrad Jules Aska are out there right now, one accidental go-around mode activation away from disaster? The responsibility to keep them out of airline cockpits must lie with the system itself — and Landsberg believed that that system failed. Regarding the FAA’s long-delayed implementation of the pilot records database, he wrote, “I can see no good reason as to why it should have taken that long.” Addressing industry pushback, he added, “If you think monitoring, training or getting a solid background check on a prospective pilot candidate is expensive, try having an accident.”
Quite honestly I don't disagree
Covid with a side of mandates probably culled the herd. Lot of industries are playing catch up. Like construction. It's pathetic these days.
Wasn't Teneriffe a runway collision? In the 70s
Anyway my weekly flights to Spokane are done for now. So I'm good
That's too bad because the Throbber would have treated you to the finest meats and cheeses and hookers and blow East Sprague could provide.
Apparently you East siders are a bit soft. The owner was loving how I whipped the place into shape but grown ass men said I was mean. Behind my back
Always easier to fire the coach. Or move me to another fire. Back on the wet side
"It seems like" is a great anecdotal approach to evaluating a system which has plenty of passenger safety statistics over a long period of time. It's nice that plane tracking and radar software is now accessible to the masses so these things can come to light and the system can continue to improve. However, I can also promise you runway conflicts forcing go-arounds occurred way before the past 3 years. Anecdotally. I've seen it. Is it worse statistically? I honestly don't know.
Hiring practices were an issue before COVID and aren't related to equity, whatever that means. Atlas Air 3591 is the clear example of this. An apparently qualified First Officer, getting through the hiring and training process, sending a 767 straight into the water because he can't maintain situational awareness. That rests with the system to identify in its hiring and training practices in the context of a labor shortage. I strongly doubt the system has been loosened to make it easier to get into a pilot seat in the past 3 years; hopefully the gaps identified through that disaster have been addressed.
In an addendum to the report, NTSB Vice Chairman Bruce Landsberg chose to look at the big picture. If we focus on Aska’s human failings, on the legacy of his lie, we miss the real safety lessons. How many other pilots just like Conrad Jules Aska are out there right now, one accidental go-around mode activation away from disaster? The responsibility to keep them out of airline cockpits must lie with the system itself — and Landsberg believed that that system failed. Regarding the FAA’s long-delayed implementation of the pilot records database, he wrote, “I can see no good reason as to why it should have taken that long.” Addressing industry pushback, he added, “If you think monitoring, training or getting a solid background check on a prospective pilot candidate is expensive, try having an accident.”
Quite honestly I don't disagree
Covid with a side of mandates probably culled the herd. Lot of industries are playing catch up. Like construction. It's pathetic these days.
Wasn't Teneriffe a runway collision? In the 70s
Anyway my weekly flights to Spokane are done for now. So I'm good
Yes Tenerife was in the mid-70s. Terrible event but needed like 30 things to go wrong for that to happen. Far more relevant was the LAX runway crash in the 90s where the controller basically forgot that a prop plane was told to taxi onto the runway and hold while a 737 was cleared to land. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Los_Angeles_runway_disaster
Tenerife was a highly skilled senior 747 pilot deciding he was tired of waiting and just decided to roll in the fog without clearance.
Yes, in the 1970s before crew resource management was a thing.
He was KLM’s chief pilot. The training standards and technical infrastructure of that era are way behind today.
And it still doesn’t happen if not for 20 other coincidences. Ultimately he fucked up but the contributing factors to that disaster are off the charts.
In the 2020s go-arounds and aborted takeoffs make almost as much news as disasters did 30+ years ago.
I've been on two aborted landings due to traffic on the runway. Neither I'm sure made the news. One in Philadelphia the other San Francisco. The one in SF I thought was the end. A DC-10 aborting a landing over the runway makes you appreciate a good pilot and the structural integrity and power of a modern airliner.
The recent revelations about hiring practices for air traffic controllers and pilots has me more concerned for the future. I see it getting worse.
I haven't seen anything about hiring practice changes; as I said before the system exists to ensure qualified pilots are identified and trained. The legislation 15 years ago to require 1500 flight hours ensures a higher level of experience amongst the application pool than at any point before that, while also contributing to the shortage.
ATC hiring may be a different story; I've heard some staffing anecdotes there but the ATC is constrained by technology at this point.
I've had my share of aborted landings too. Aircraft are built incredibly well except when Boeing decides to fuck up their software. I feel completely safe on commercial aircraft virtually anywhere in the world. (Intra-Africa travel is something).
"It seems like" is a great anecdotal approach to evaluating a system which has plenty of passenger safety statistics over a long period of time. It's nice that plane tracking and radar software is now accessible to the masses so these things can come to light and the system can continue to improve. However, I can also promise you runway conflicts forcing go-arounds occurred way before the past 3 years. Anecdotally. I've seen it. Is it worse statistically? I honestly don't know.
Hiring practices were an issue before COVID and aren't related to equity, whatever that means. Atlas Air 3591 is the clear example of this. An apparently qualified First Officer, getting through the hiring and training process, sending a 767 straight into the water because he can't maintain situational awareness. That rests with the system to identify in its hiring and training practices in the context of a labor shortage. I strongly doubt the system has been loosened to make it easier to get into a pilot seat in the past 3 years; hopefully the gaps identified through that disaster have been addressed.
In an addendum to the report, NTSB Vice Chairman Bruce Landsberg chose to look at the big picture. If we focus on Aska’s human failings, on the legacy of his lie, we miss the real safety lessons. How many other pilots just like Conrad Jules Aska are out there right now, one accidental go-around mode activation away from disaster? The responsibility to keep them out of airline cockpits must lie with the system itself — and Landsberg believed that that system failed. Regarding the FAA’s long-delayed implementation of the pilot records database, he wrote, “I can see no good reason as to why it should have taken that long.” Addressing industry pushback, he added, “If you think monitoring, training or getting a solid background check on a prospective pilot candidate is expensive, try having an accident.”
Quite honestly I don't disagree
Covid with a side of mandates probably culled the herd. Lot of industries are playing catch up. Like construction. It's pathetic these days.
Wasn't Teneriffe a runway collision? In the 70s
Anyway my weekly flights to Spokane are done for now. So I'm good
Yes Tenerife was in the mid-70s. Terrible event but needed like 30 things to go wrong for that to happen. Far more relevant was the LAX runway crash in the 90s where the controller basically forgot that a prop plane was told to taxi onto the runway and hold while a 737 was cleared to land. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Los_Angeles_runway_disaster
Tenerife was a highly skilled senior 747 pilot deciding he was tired of waiting and just decided to roll in the fog without clearance.
Yes, in the 1970s before crew resource management was a thing.
He was KLM’s chief pilot. The training standards and technical infrastructure of that era are way behind today.
And it still doesn’t happen if not for 20 other coincidences. Ultimately he fucked up but the contributing factors to that disaster are off the charts.
In the 2020s go-arounds and aborted takeoffs make almost as much news as disasters did 30+ years ago.
I've been on two aborted landings due to traffic on the runway. Neither I'm sure made the news. One in Philadelphia the other San Francisco. The one in SF I thought was the end. A DC-10 aborting a landing over the runway makes you appreciate a good pilot and the structural integrity and power of a modern airliner.
The recent revelations about hiring practices for air traffic controllers and pilots has me more concerned for the future. I see it getting worse.
I haven't seen anything about hiring practice changes; as I said before the system exists to ensure qualified pilots are identified and trained. The legislation 15 years ago to require 1500 flight hours ensures a higher level of experience amongst the application pool than at any point before that, while also contributing to the shortage.
ATC hiring may be a different story; I've heard some staffing anecdotes there but the ATC is constrained by technology at this point.
I've had my share of aborted landings too. Aircraft are built incredibly well except when Boeing decides to fuck up their software. I feel completely safe on commercial aircraft virtually anywhere in the world. (Intra-Africa travel is something).
You heard about the co-pilot who crashed the Amazon Prime 767 into a Houston lake on approach? Tragic that he was at the controls of an aircraft.
Showing up on time. Hard work Self reliance Respect authority Delaying gratification Merit based standards
All signs of white supremacy.
So glad medical schools are eroding silly standards like test scores to satisfy equity requirements. If I'm under the knife or undergoing cancer treatment, I don't care about merit, equity is much more important.
"White people generally who have their antennae up, who understand what is happening in society, have learned the meaning of microaggression. They’ve learned the meaning of how to be welcoming, how to be professional, how to make this community better suited for diversity in its professional class, including its lawyers," he said.
"It seems like" is a great anecdotal approach to evaluating a system which has plenty of passenger safety statistics over a long period of time. It's nice that plane tracking and radar software is now accessible to the masses so these things can come to light and the system can continue to improve. However, I can also promise you runway conflicts forcing go-arounds occurred way before the past 3 years. Anecdotally. I've seen it. Is it worse statistically? I honestly don't know.
Hiring practices were an issue before COVID and aren't related to equity, whatever that means. Atlas Air 3591 is the clear example of this. An apparently qualified First Officer, getting through the hiring and training process, sending a 767 straight into the water because he can't maintain situational awareness. That rests with the system to identify in its hiring and training practices in the context of a labor shortage. I strongly doubt the system has been loosened to make it easier to get into a pilot seat in the past 3 years; hopefully the gaps identified through that disaster have been addressed.
In an addendum to the report, NTSB Vice Chairman Bruce Landsberg chose to look at the big picture. If we focus on Aska’s human failings, on the legacy of his lie, we miss the real safety lessons. How many other pilots just like Conrad Jules Aska are out there right now, one accidental go-around mode activation away from disaster? The responsibility to keep them out of airline cockpits must lie with the system itself — and Landsberg believed that that system failed. Regarding the FAA’s long-delayed implementation of the pilot records database, he wrote, “I can see no good reason as to why it should have taken that long.” Addressing industry pushback, he added, “If you think monitoring, training or getting a solid background check on a prospective pilot candidate is expensive, try having an accident.”
Quite honestly I don't disagree
Covid with a side of mandates probably culled the herd. Lot of industries are playing catch up. Like construction. It's pathetic these days.
Wasn't Teneriffe a runway collision? In the 70s
Anyway my weekly flights to Spokane are done for now. So I'm good
Yes Tenerife was in the mid-70s. Terrible event but needed like 30 things to go wrong for that to happen. Far more relevant was the LAX runway crash in the 90s where the controller basically forgot that a prop plane was told to taxi onto the runway and hold while a 737 was cleared to land. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Los_Angeles_runway_disaster
Tenerife was a highly skilled senior 747 pilot deciding he was tired of waiting and just decided to roll in the fog without clearance.
"It seems like" is a great anecdotal approach to evaluating a system which has plenty of passenger safety statistics over a long period of time. It's nice that plane tracking and radar software is now accessible to the masses so these things can come to light and the system can continue to improve. However, I can also promise you runway conflicts forcing go-arounds occurred way before the past 3 years. Anecdotally. I've seen it. Is it worse statistically? I honestly don't know.
Hiring practices were an issue before COVID and aren't related to equity, whatever that means. Atlas Air 3591 is the clear example of this. An apparently qualified First Officer, getting through the hiring and training process, sending a 767 straight into the water because he can't maintain situational awareness. That rests with the system to identify in its hiring and training practices in the context of a labor shortage. I strongly doubt the system has been loosened to make it easier to get into a pilot seat in the past 3 years; hopefully the gaps identified through that disaster have been addressed.
In an addendum to the report, NTSB Vice Chairman Bruce Landsberg chose to look at the big picture. If we focus on Aska’s human failings, on the legacy of his lie, we miss the real safety lessons. How many other pilots just like Conrad Jules Aska are out there right now, one accidental go-around mode activation away from disaster? The responsibility to keep them out of airline cockpits must lie with the system itself — and Landsberg believed that that system failed. Regarding the FAA’s long-delayed implementation of the pilot records database, he wrote, “I can see no good reason as to why it should have taken that long.” Addressing industry pushback, he added, “If you think monitoring, training or getting a solid background check on a prospective pilot candidate is expensive, try having an accident.”
Quite honestly I don't disagree
Covid with a side of mandates probably culled the herd. Lot of industries are playing catch up. Like construction. It's pathetic these days.
Wasn't Teneriffe a runway collision? In the 70s
Anyway my weekly flights to Spokane are done for now. So I'm good
Yes Tenerife was in the mid-70s. Terrible event but needed like 30 things to go wrong for that to happen. Far more relevant was the LAX runway crash in the 90s where the controller basically forgot that a prop plane was told to taxi onto the runway and hold while a 737 was cleared to land. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Los_Angeles_runway_disaster
Tenerife was a highly skilled senior 747 pilot deciding he was tired of waiting and just decided to roll in the fog without clearance.
Yes, in the 1970s before crew resource management was a thing.
He was KLM’s chief pilot. The training standards and technical infrastructure of that era are way behind today.
And it still doesn’t happen if not for 20 other coincidences. Ultimately he fucked up but the contributing factors to that disaster are off the charts.
In the 2020s go-arounds and aborted takeoffs make almost as much news as disasters did 30+ years ago.
I've been on two aborted landings due to traffic on the runway. Neither I'm sure made the news. One in Philadelphia the other San Francisco. The one in SF I thought was the end. A DC-10 aborting a landing over the runway makes you appreciate a good pilot and the structural integrity and power of a modern airliner.
The recent revelations about hiring practices for air traffic controllers and pilots has me more concerned for the future. I see it getting worse.
I haven't seen anything about hiring practice changes; as I said before the system exists to ensure qualified pilots are identified and trained. The legislation 15 years ago to require 1500 flight hours ensures a higher level of experience amongst the application pool than at any point before that, while also contributing to the shortage.
ATC hiring may be a different story; I've heard some staffing anecdotes there but the ATC is constrained by technology at this point.
I've had my share of aborted landings too. Aircraft are built incredibly well except when Boeing decides to fuck up their software. I feel completely safe on commercial aircraft virtually anywhere in the world. (Intra-Africa travel is something).
You heard about the co-pilot who crashed the Amazon Prime 767 into a Houston lake on approach? Tragic that he was at the controls of an aircraft.
"It seems like" is a great anecdotal approach to evaluating a system which has plenty of passenger safety statistics over a long period of time. It's nice that plane tracking and radar software is now accessible to the masses so these things can come to light and the system can continue to improve. However, I can also promise you runway conflicts forcing go-arounds occurred way before the past 3 years. Anecdotally. I've seen it. Is it worse statistically? I honestly don't know.
Hiring practices were an issue before COVID and aren't related to equity, whatever that means. Atlas Air 3591 is the clear example of this. An apparently qualified First Officer, getting through the hiring and training process, sending a 767 straight into the water because he can't maintain situational awareness. That rests with the system to identify in its hiring and training practices in the context of a labor shortage. I strongly doubt the system has been loosened to make it easier to get into a pilot seat in the past 3 years; hopefully the gaps identified through that disaster have been addressed.
In an addendum to the report, NTSB Vice Chairman Bruce Landsberg chose to look at the big picture. If we focus on Aska’s human failings, on the legacy of his lie, we miss the real safety lessons. How many other pilots just like Conrad Jules Aska are out there right now, one accidental go-around mode activation away from disaster? The responsibility to keep them out of airline cockpits must lie with the system itself — and Landsberg believed that that system failed. Regarding the FAA’s long-delayed implementation of the pilot records database, he wrote, “I can see no good reason as to why it should have taken that long.” Addressing industry pushback, he added, “If you think monitoring, training or getting a solid background check on a prospective pilot candidate is expensive, try having an accident.”
Quite honestly I don't disagree
Covid with a side of mandates probably culled the herd. Lot of industries are playing catch up. Like construction. It's pathetic these days.
Wasn't Teneriffe a runway collision? In the 70s
Anyway my weekly flights to Spokane are done for now. So I'm good
Yes Tenerife was in the mid-70s. Terrible event but needed like 30 things to go wrong for that to happen. Far more relevant was the LAX runway crash in the 90s where the controller basically forgot that a prop plane was told to taxi onto the runway and hold while a 737 was cleared to land. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Los_Angeles_runway_disaster
Tenerife was a highly skilled senior 747 pilot deciding he was tired of waiting and just decided to roll in the fog without clearance.
Yes, in the 1970s before crew resource management was a thing.
He was KLM’s chief pilot. The training standards and technical infrastructure of that era are way behind today.
And it still doesn’t happen if not for 20 other coincidences. Ultimately he fucked up but the contributing factors to that disaster are off the charts.
In the 2020s go-arounds and aborted takeoffs make almost as much news as disasters did 30+ years ago.
I've been on two aborted landings due to traffic on the runway. Neither I'm sure made the news. One in Philadelphia the other San Francisco. The one in SF I thought was the end. A DC-10 aborting a landing over the runway makes you appreciate a good pilot and the structural integrity and power of a modern airliner.
The recent revelations about hiring practices for air traffic controllers and pilots has me more concerned for the future. I see it getting worse.
I haven't seen anything about hiring practice changes; as I said before the system exists to ensure qualified pilots are identified and trained. The legislation 15 years ago to require 1500 flight hours ensures a higher level of experience amongst the application pool than at any point before that, while also contributing to the shortage.
ATC hiring may be a different story; I've heard some staffing anecdotes there but the ATC is constrained by technology at this point.
I've had my share of aborted landings too. Aircraft are built incredibly well except when Boeing decides to fuck up their software. I feel completely safe on commercial aircraft virtually anywhere in the world. (Intra-Africa travel is something).
You heard about the co-pilot who crashed the Amazon Prime 767 into a Houston lake on approach? Tragic that he was at the controls of an aircraft.
Yes, I already referenced that on the first page of the thread.
"It seems like" is a great anecdotal approach to evaluating a system which has plenty of passenger safety statistics over a long period of time. It's nice that plane tracking and radar software is now accessible to the masses so these things can come to light and the system can continue to improve. However, I can also promise you runway conflicts forcing go-arounds occurred way before the past 3 years. Anecdotally. I've seen it. Is it worse statistically? I honestly don't know.
Hiring practices were an issue before COVID and aren't related to equity, whatever that means. Atlas Air 3591 is the clear example of this. An apparently qualified First Officer, getting through the hiring and training process, sending a 767 straight into the water because he can't maintain situational awareness. That rests with the system to identify in its hiring and training practices in the context of a labor shortage. I strongly doubt the system has been loosened to make it easier to get into a pilot seat in the past 3 years; hopefully the gaps identified through that disaster have been addressed.
In an addendum to the report, NTSB Vice Chairman Bruce Landsberg chose to look at the big picture. If we focus on Aska’s human failings, on the legacy of his lie, we miss the real safety lessons. How many other pilots just like Conrad Jules Aska are out there right now, one accidental go-around mode activation away from disaster? The responsibility to keep them out of airline cockpits must lie with the system itself — and Landsberg believed that that system failed. Regarding the FAA’s long-delayed implementation of the pilot records database, he wrote, “I can see no good reason as to why it should have taken that long.” Addressing industry pushback, he added, “If you think monitoring, training or getting a solid background check on a prospective pilot candidate is expensive, try having an accident.”
"It seems like" is a great anecdotal approach to evaluating a system which has plenty of passenger safety statistics over a long period of time. It's nice that plane tracking and radar software is now accessible to the masses so these things can come to light and the system can continue to improve. However, I can also promise you runway conflicts forcing go-arounds occurred way before the past 3 years. Anecdotally. I've seen it. Is it worse statistically? I honestly don't know.
Hiring practices were an issue before COVID and aren't related to equity, whatever that means. Atlas Air 3591 is the clear example of this. An apparently qualified First Officer, getting through the hiring and training process, sending a 767 straight into the water because he can't maintain situational awareness. That rests with the system to identify in its hiring and training practices in the context of a labor shortage. I strongly doubt the system has been loosened to make it easier to get into a pilot seat in the past 3 years; hopefully the gaps identified through that disaster have been addressed.
In an addendum to the report, NTSB Vice Chairman Bruce Landsberg chose to look at the big picture. If we focus on Aska’s human failings, on the legacy of his lie, we miss the real safety lessons. How many other pilots just like Conrad Jules Aska are out there right now, one accidental go-around mode activation away from disaster? The responsibility to keep them out of airline cockpits must lie with the system itself — and Landsberg believed that that system failed. Regarding the FAA’s long-delayed implementation of the pilot records database, he wrote, “I can see no good reason as to why it should have taken that long.” Addressing industry pushback, he added, “If you think monitoring, training or getting a solid background check on a prospective pilot candidate is expensive, try having an accident.”
Quite honestly I don't disagree
Covid with a side of mandates probably culled the herd. Lot of industries are playing catch up. Like construction. It's pathetic these days.
Wasn't Teneriffe a runway collision? In the 70s
Anyway my weekly flights to Spokane are done for now. So I'm good
Yes Tenerife was in the mid-70s. Terrible event but needed like 30 things to go wrong for that to happen. Far more relevant was the LAX runway crash in the 90s where the controller basically forgot that a prop plane was told to taxi onto the runway and hold while a 737 was cleared to land. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Los_Angeles_runway_disaster
Tenerife was a highly skilled senior 747 pilot deciding he was tired of waiting and just decided to roll in the fog without clearance.
Yes, in the 1970s before crew resource management was a thing.
He was KLM’s chief pilot. The training standards and technical infrastructure of that era are way behind today.
And it still doesn’t happen if not for 20 other coincidences. Ultimately he fucked up but the contributing factors to that disaster are off the charts.
In the 2020s go-arounds and aborted takeoffs make almost as much news as disasters did 30+ years ago.
I've been on two aborted landings due to traffic on the runway. Neither I'm sure made the news. One in Philadelphia the other San Francisco. The one in SF I thought was the end. A DC-10 aborting a landing over the runway makes you appreciate a good pilot and the structural integrity and power of a modern airliner.
The recent revelations about hiring practices for air traffic controllers and pilots has me more concerned for the future. I see it getting worse.
I haven't seen anything about hiring practice changes; as I said before the system exists to ensure qualified pilots are identified and trained. The legislation 15 years ago to require 1500 flight hours ensures a higher level of experience amongst the application pool than at any point before that, while also contributing to the shortage.
ATC hiring may be a different story; I've heard some staffing anecdotes there but the ATC is constrained by technology at this point.
I've had my share of aborted landings too. Aircraft are built incredibly well except when Boeing decides to fuck up their software. I feel completely safe on commercial aircraft virtually anywhere in the world. (Intra-Africa travel is something).
You heard about the co-pilot who crashed the Amazon Prime 767 into a Houston lake on approach? Tragic that he was at the controls of an aircraft.
Yes, I already referenced that on the first page of the thread.
"It seems like" is a great anecdotal approach to evaluating a system which has plenty of passenger safety statistics over a long period of time. It's nice that plane tracking and radar software is now accessible to the masses so these things can come to light and the system can continue to improve. However, I can also promise you runway conflicts forcing go-arounds occurred way before the past 3 years. Anecdotally. I've seen it. Is it worse statistically? I honestly don't know.
Hiring practices were an issue before COVID and aren't related to equity, whatever that means. Atlas Air 3591 is the clear example of this. An apparently qualified First Officer, getting through the hiring and training process, sending a 767 straight into the water because he can't maintain situational awareness. That rests with the system to identify in its hiring and training practices in the context of a labor shortage. I strongly doubt the system has been loosened to make it easier to get into a pilot seat in the past 3 years; hopefully the gaps identified through that disaster have been addressed.
In an addendum to the report, NTSB Vice Chairman Bruce Landsberg chose to look at the big picture. If we focus on Aska’s human failings, on the legacy of his lie, we miss the real safety lessons. How many other pilots just like Conrad Jules Aska are out there right now, one accidental go-around mode activation away from disaster? The responsibility to keep them out of airline cockpits must lie with the system itself — and Landsberg believed that that system failed. Regarding the FAA’s long-delayed implementation of the pilot records database, he wrote, “I can see no good reason as to why it should have taken that long.” Addressing industry pushback, he added, “If you think monitoring, training or getting a solid background check on a prospective pilot candidate is expensive, try having an accident.”
If standards have not been loosened and diversity not at play then how did he get in the co-pilot seat? The CEO of United has made it his mission.
United plans to hire 5000 pilot trainees by 2030 in it’s push to train new pilots. In the name of diversity over half will be women and minorities.
I’m old fashioned. When I get on a airplane I want the person in the pilot seat to be the best of the best because that’s what landed them in that seat. Call be crazy.
"It seems like" is a great anecdotal approach to evaluating a system which has plenty of passenger safety statistics over a long period of time. It's nice that plane tracking and radar software is now accessible to the masses so these things can come to light and the system can continue to improve. However, I can also promise you runway conflicts forcing go-arounds occurred way before the past 3 years. Anecdotally. I've seen it. Is it worse statistically? I honestly don't know.
Hiring practices were an issue before COVID and aren't related to equity, whatever that means. Atlas Air 3591 is the clear example of this. An apparently qualified First Officer, getting through the hiring and training process, sending a 767 straight into the water because he can't maintain situational awareness. That rests with the system to identify in its hiring and training practices in the context of a labor shortage. I strongly doubt the system has been loosened to make it easier to get into a pilot seat in the past 3 years; hopefully the gaps identified through that disaster have been addressed.
In an addendum to the report, NTSB Vice Chairman Bruce Landsberg chose to look at the big picture. If we focus on Aska’s human failings, on the legacy of his lie, we miss the real safety lessons. How many other pilots just like Conrad Jules Aska are out there right now, one accidental go-around mode activation away from disaster? The responsibility to keep them out of airline cockpits must lie with the system itself — and Landsberg believed that that system failed. Regarding the FAA’s long-delayed implementation of the pilot records database, he wrote, “I can see no good reason as to why it should have taken that long.” Addressing industry pushback, he added, “If you think monitoring, training or getting a solid background check on a prospective pilot candidate is expensive, try having an accident.”
Quite honestly I don't disagree
Covid with a side of mandates probably culled the herd. Lot of industries are playing catch up. Like construction. It's pathetic these days.
Wasn't Teneriffe a runway collision? In the 70s
Anyway my weekly flights to Spokane are done for now. So I'm good
Yes Tenerife was in the mid-70s. Terrible event but needed like 30 things to go wrong for that to happen. Far more relevant was the LAX runway crash in the 90s where the controller basically forgot that a prop plane was told to taxi onto the runway and hold while a 737 was cleared to land. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Los_Angeles_runway_disaster
Tenerife was a highly skilled senior 747 pilot deciding he was tired of waiting and just decided to roll in the fog without clearance.
Yes, in the 1970s before crew resource management was a thing.
He was KLM’s chief pilot. The training standards and technical infrastructure of that era are way behind today.
And it still doesn’t happen if not for 20 other coincidences. Ultimately he fucked up but the contributing factors to that disaster are off the charts.
In the 2020s go-arounds and aborted takeoffs make almost as much news as disasters did 30+ years ago.
I've been on two aborted landings due to traffic on the runway. Neither I'm sure made the news. One in Philadelphia the other San Francisco. The one in SF I thought was the end. A DC-10 aborting a landing over the runway makes you appreciate a good pilot and the structural integrity and power of a modern airliner.
The recent revelations about hiring practices for air traffic controllers and pilots has me more concerned for the future. I see it getting worse.
I haven't seen anything about hiring practice changes; as I said before the system exists to ensure qualified pilots are identified and trained. The legislation 15 years ago to require 1500 flight hours ensures a higher level of experience amongst the application pool than at any point before that, while also contributing to the shortage.
ATC hiring may be a different story; I've heard some staffing anecdotes there but the ATC is constrained by technology at this point.
I've had my share of aborted landings too. Aircraft are built incredibly well except when Boeing decides to fuck up their software. I feel completely safe on commercial aircraft virtually anywhere in the world. (Intra-Africa travel is something).
You heard about the co-pilot who crashed the Amazon Prime 767 into a Houston lake on approach? Tragic that he was at the controls of an aircraft.
Yes, I already referenced that on the first page of the thread.
"It seems like" is a great anecdotal approach to evaluating a system which has plenty of passenger safety statistics over a long period of time. It's nice that plane tracking and radar software is now accessible to the masses so these things can come to light and the system can continue to improve. However, I can also promise you runway conflicts forcing go-arounds occurred way before the past 3 years. Anecdotally. I've seen it. Is it worse statistically? I honestly don't know.
Hiring practices were an issue before COVID and aren't related to equity, whatever that means. Atlas Air 3591 is the clear example of this. An apparently qualified First Officer, getting through the hiring and training process, sending a 767 straight into the water because he can't maintain situational awareness. That rests with the system to identify in its hiring and training practices in the context of a labor shortage. I strongly doubt the system has been loosened to make it easier to get into a pilot seat in the past 3 years; hopefully the gaps identified through that disaster have been addressed.
In an addendum to the report, NTSB Vice Chairman Bruce Landsberg chose to look at the big picture. If we focus on Aska’s human failings, on the legacy of his lie, we miss the real safety lessons. How many other pilots just like Conrad Jules Aska are out there right now, one accidental go-around mode activation away from disaster? The responsibility to keep them out of airline cockpits must lie with the system itself — and Landsberg believed that that system failed. Regarding the FAA’s long-delayed implementation of the pilot records database, he wrote, “I can see no good reason as to why it should have taken that long.” Addressing industry pushback, he added, “If you think monitoring, training or getting a solid background check on a prospective pilot candidate is expensive, try having an accident.”
If standards have not been loosened and diversity not at play then how did he get in the co-pilot seat? The CEO of United has made it his mission.
United plans to hire 5000 pilot trainees by 2030 in it’s push to train new pilots. In the name of diversity over half will be women and minorities.
I’m old fashioned. When I get on a airplane I want the person in the pilot seat to be the best of the best because that’s what landed them in that seat. Call be crazy.
Standards haven't been loosened. You need to provide some evidence of "diversity at play" as the reason that guy was in the first officer's seat. I already provided a link describing this accident. He lied on his application. All the information Atlas had to hire him suggested he was well above the minimum hiring criteria.
Safety Issues Atlas’ evaluation of the FO. The FO failed to disclose to Atlas some of the training difficulties he experienced at former employers, and Atlas’ records review did not identify the FO’s past training failure at one former employer, which may have affected how Atlas evaluated him during the hiring process and during training;
• Industry pilot hiring process deficiencies. Limitations in the background records retrieval process places hiring operators (like Atlas when considering the FO’s application) at a disadvantage when trying to obtain a complete training history on a pilot applicant. Also, the circumstances of this accident highlighted a need for improved pilot selection and performance measurement methods;
2.4 Atlas' evaluation of the First Officer Atlas’ director of training was unaware of the FO’s previous failures to complete initial training at two other airlines and his unsuccessful attempt to upgrade to captain at a third; however, it is not known how this information would have affected Atlas’ evaluation of the FO’s hiring application or his performance in its own initial training program. Based on the FO’s total flight hours, experience at Part 121 air carriers, and experience in turbine-powered airplanes, he met Atlas’ criteria for a highly competitive applicant and was rated “highly recommended” during the hiring process. Although the average total flight experience for newly hired pilots at Atlas had decreased in recent years, the FO’s experience far exceeded Atlas’ minimum requirements, and there was no evidence that Atlas was under any pressure to hire or retain any pilot with whom it had any performance or other safety concerns.
3.2 Probable Cause The NTSB determines that the probable cause of this accident was the inappropriate response by the first officer as the pilot flying to an inadvertent activation of the go-around mode, which led to his spatial disorientation and nose-down control inputs that placed the airplane in a steep descent from which the crew did not recover. Contributing to the accident was the captain’s failure to adequately monitor the airplane’s flightpath and assume positive control of the airplane to effectively intervene. Also contributing were systemic deficiencies in the aviation industry’s selection and performance measurement practices, which failed to address the first officer’s aptitude-related deficiencies and maladaptive stress response. Also contributing to the accident was the Federal Aviation Administration’s failure to implement the pilot records database in a sufficiently robust and timely manner.
--------- If you think your pilot being the best of the best is what keeps you safe on a commercial flight you're sorely mistaken. Aviation is a system. Individuals, except in extreme circumstances, cannot compensate for system deficiencies. To make the system safe, there are minimum requirements throughout it. Aircraft design and certification (sigh, Boeing/FAA), maintenance, ATC, flight ops including hiring and training. Those have been improved over the past 70 years of aviation. Like any complex system, things can go wrong, but it's incredibly safe. The standards apply to everyone. Horrific, unrecognized incompetence (or maliciousness) in certain key areas can doom an airliner, but that requires a bad actor.
I don't really care how they got there. If they exceed the system requirements I trust them to be competent and safe. The industry doesn't have enough of them.
Comments
He was KLM’s chief pilot. The training standards and technical infrastructure of that era are way behind today.
And it still doesn’t happen if not for 20 other coincidences. Ultimately he fucked up but the contributing factors to that disaster are off the charts.
In the 2020s go-arounds and aborted takeoffs make almost as much news as disasters did 30+ years ago.
The recent revelations about hiring practices for air traffic controllers and pilots has me more concerned for the future. I see it getting worse.
Always easier to fire the coach. Or move me to another fire. Back on the wet side
ATC hiring may be a different story; I've heard some staffing anecdotes there but the ATC is constrained by technology at this point.
I've had my share of aborted landings too. Aircraft are built incredibly well except when Boeing decides to fuck up their software. I feel completely safe on commercial aircraft virtually anywhere in the world. (Intra-Africa travel is something).
United plans to hire 5000 pilot trainees by 2030 in it’s push to train new pilots. In the name of diversity over half will be women and minorities.
I’m old fashioned. When I get on a airplane I want the person in the pilot seat to be the best of the best because that’s what landed them in that seat. Call be crazy.
Consider the actual NTSB report, which says:
Safety Issues
Atlas’ evaluation of the FO. The FO failed to disclose to Atlas some of the training
difficulties he experienced at former employers, and Atlas’ records review did not
identify the FO’s past training failure at one former employer, which may have affected
how Atlas evaluated him during the hiring process and during training;
• Industry pilot hiring process deficiencies. Limitations in the background records
retrieval process places hiring operators (like Atlas when considering the FO’s
application) at a disadvantage when trying to obtain a complete training history on a
pilot applicant. Also, the circumstances of this accident highlighted a need for
improved pilot selection and performance measurement methods;
2.4 Atlas' evaluation of the First Officer
Atlas’ director of training was
unaware of the FO’s previous failures to complete initial training at two other airlines and his
unsuccessful attempt to upgrade to captain at a third; however, it is not known how this information
would have affected Atlas’ evaluation of the FO’s hiring application or his performance in its own
initial training program. Based on the FO’s total flight hours, experience at Part 121 air carriers,
and experience in turbine-powered airplanes, he met Atlas’ criteria for a highly competitive
applicant and was rated “highly recommended” during the hiring process. Although the average
total flight experience for newly hired pilots at Atlas had decreased in recent years, the FO’s
experience far exceeded Atlas’ minimum requirements, and there was no evidence that Atlas was
under any pressure to hire or retain any pilot with whom it had any performance or other safety
concerns.
3.2 Probable Cause
The NTSB determines that the probable cause of this accident was the inappropriate
response by the first officer as the pilot flying to an inadvertent activation of the go-around mode,
which led to his spatial disorientation and nose-down control inputs that placed the airplane in a
steep descent from which the crew did not recover. Contributing to the accident was the captain’s
failure to adequately monitor the airplane’s flightpath and assume positive control of the airplane
to effectively intervene. Also contributing were systemic deficiencies in the aviation industry’s
selection and performance measurement practices, which failed to address the first officer’s
aptitude-related deficiencies and maladaptive stress response. Also contributing to the accident
was the Federal Aviation Administration’s failure to implement the pilot records database in a
sufficiently robust and timely manner.
---------
If you think your pilot being the best of the best is what keeps you safe on a commercial flight you're sorely mistaken. Aviation is a system. Individuals, except in extreme circumstances, cannot compensate for system deficiencies. To make the system safe, there are minimum requirements throughout it. Aircraft design and certification (sigh, Boeing/FAA), maintenance, ATC, flight ops including hiring and training. Those have been improved over the past 70 years of aviation. Like any complex system, things can go wrong, but it's incredibly safe. The standards apply to everyone. Horrific, unrecognized incompetence (or maliciousness) in certain key areas can doom an airliner, but that requires a bad actor.
I don't really care how they got there. If they exceed the system requirements I trust them to be competent and safe. The industry doesn't have enough of them.