Equity in the workforce
Comments
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Delta just approved a 34% raise for their pilots.georgiaduck said:Lots of pilots are hitting forced retirement age (65) over the next few years so airlines are looking for anything to keep the pipeline full. Current pilots just got an 18% raise to keep them with their company.
I won't name the airline (but it's based in Atlanta and rhymes with Schmelta) hired a pilot who failed nine checkrides. Not exactly a sterling record there. -
Tenerife was a highly skilled senior 747 pilot deciding he was tired of waiting and just decided to roll in the fog without clearance.whlinder said:
Yes Tenerife was in the mid-70s. Terrible event but needed like 30 things to go wrong for that to happen. Far more relevant was the LAX runway crash in the 90s where the controller basically forgot that a prop plane was told to taxi onto the runway and hold while a 737 was cleared to land. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Los_Angeles_runway_disasterRaceBannon said:
Quite honestly I don't disagreewhlinder said:"It seems like" is a great anecdotal approach to evaluating a system which has plenty of passenger safety statistics over a long period of time. It's nice that plane tracking and radar software is now accessible to the masses so these things can come to light and the system can continue to improve. However, I can also promise you runway conflicts forcing go-arounds occurred way before the past 3 years. Anecdotally. I've seen it. Is it worse statistically? I honestly don't know.
Hiring practices were an issue before COVID and aren't related to equity, whatever that means. Atlas Air 3591 is the clear example of this. An apparently qualified First Officer, getting through the hiring and training process, sending a 767 straight into the water because he can't maintain situational awareness. That rests with the system to identify in its hiring and training practices in the context of a labor shortage. I strongly doubt the system has been loosened to make it easier to get into a pilot seat in the past 3 years; hopefully the gaps identified through that disaster have been addressed.
https://admiralcloudberg.medium.com/legacy-of-a-lie-the-crash-of-atlas-air-flight-3591-519a3a7bd6ecIn an addendum to the report, NTSB Vice Chairman Bruce Landsberg chose to look at the big picture. If we focus on Aska’s human failings, on the legacy of his lie, we miss the real safety lessons. How many other pilots just like Conrad Jules Aska are out there right now, one accidental go-around mode activation away from disaster? The responsibility to keep them out of airline cockpits must lie with the system itself — and Landsberg believed that that system failed. Regarding the FAA’s long-delayed implementation of the pilot records database, he wrote, “I can see no good reason as to why it should have taken that long.” Addressing industry pushback, he added, “If you think monitoring, training or getting a solid background check on a prospective pilot candidate is expensive, try having an accident.”
Covid with a side of mandates probably culled the herd. Lot of industries are playing catch up. Like construction. It's pathetic these days.
Wasn't Teneriffe a runway collision? In the 70s
Anyway my weekly flights to Spokane are done for now. So I'm good -
Yes, in the 1970s before crew resource management was a thing.46XiJCAB said:
Tenerife was a highly skilled senior 747 pilot deciding he was tired of waiting and just decided to roll in the fog without clearance.whlinder said:
Yes Tenerife was in the mid-70s. Terrible event but needed like 30 things to go wrong for that to happen. Far more relevant was the LAX runway crash in the 90s where the controller basically forgot that a prop plane was told to taxi onto the runway and hold while a 737 was cleared to land. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Los_Angeles_runway_disasterRaceBannon said:
Quite honestly I don't disagreewhlinder said:"It seems like" is a great anecdotal approach to evaluating a system which has plenty of passenger safety statistics over a long period of time. It's nice that plane tracking and radar software is now accessible to the masses so these things can come to light and the system can continue to improve. However, I can also promise you runway conflicts forcing go-arounds occurred way before the past 3 years. Anecdotally. I've seen it. Is it worse statistically? I honestly don't know.
Hiring practices were an issue before COVID and aren't related to equity, whatever that means. Atlas Air 3591 is the clear example of this. An apparently qualified First Officer, getting through the hiring and training process, sending a 767 straight into the water because he can't maintain situational awareness. That rests with the system to identify in its hiring and training practices in the context of a labor shortage. I strongly doubt the system has been loosened to make it easier to get into a pilot seat in the past 3 years; hopefully the gaps identified through that disaster have been addressed.
https://admiralcloudberg.medium.com/legacy-of-a-lie-the-crash-of-atlas-air-flight-3591-519a3a7bd6ecIn an addendum to the report, NTSB Vice Chairman Bruce Landsberg chose to look at the big picture. If we focus on Aska’s human failings, on the legacy of his lie, we miss the real safety lessons. How many other pilots just like Conrad Jules Aska are out there right now, one accidental go-around mode activation away from disaster? The responsibility to keep them out of airline cockpits must lie with the system itself — and Landsberg believed that that system failed. Regarding the FAA’s long-delayed implementation of the pilot records database, he wrote, “I can see no good reason as to why it should have taken that long.” Addressing industry pushback, he added, “If you think monitoring, training or getting a solid background check on a prospective pilot candidate is expensive, try having an accident.”
Covid with a side of mandates probably culled the herd. Lot of industries are playing catch up. Like construction. It's pathetic these days.
Wasn't Teneriffe a runway collision? In the 70s
Anyway my weekly flights to Spokane are done for now. So I'm good
He was KLM’s chief pilot. The training standards and technical infrastructure of that era are way behind today.
And it still doesn’t happen if not for 20 other coincidences. Ultimately he fucked up but the contributing factors to that disaster are off the charts.
In the 2020s go-arounds and aborted takeoffs make almost as much news as disasters did 30+ years ago. -
I've been on two aborted landings due to traffic on the runway. Neither I'm sure made the news. One in Philadelphia the other San Francisco. The one in SF I thought was the end. A DC-10 aborting a landing over the runway makes you appreciate a good pilot and the structural integrity and power of a modern airliner.whlinder said:
Yes, in the 1970s before crew resource management was a thing.46XiJCAB said:
Tenerife was a highly skilled senior 747 pilot deciding he was tired of waiting and just decided to roll in the fog without clearance.whlinder said:
Yes Tenerife was in the mid-70s. Terrible event but needed like 30 things to go wrong for that to happen. Far more relevant was the LAX runway crash in the 90s where the controller basically forgot that a prop plane was told to taxi onto the runway and hold while a 737 was cleared to land. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Los_Angeles_runway_disasterRaceBannon said:
Quite honestly I don't disagreewhlinder said:"It seems like" is a great anecdotal approach to evaluating a system which has plenty of passenger safety statistics over a long period of time. It's nice that plane tracking and radar software is now accessible to the masses so these things can come to light and the system can continue to improve. However, I can also promise you runway conflicts forcing go-arounds occurred way before the past 3 years. Anecdotally. I've seen it. Is it worse statistically? I honestly don't know.
Hiring practices were an issue before COVID and aren't related to equity, whatever that means. Atlas Air 3591 is the clear example of this. An apparently qualified First Officer, getting through the hiring and training process, sending a 767 straight into the water because he can't maintain situational awareness. That rests with the system to identify in its hiring and training practices in the context of a labor shortage. I strongly doubt the system has been loosened to make it easier to get into a pilot seat in the past 3 years; hopefully the gaps identified through that disaster have been addressed.
https://admiralcloudberg.medium.com/legacy-of-a-lie-the-crash-of-atlas-air-flight-3591-519a3a7bd6ecIn an addendum to the report, NTSB Vice Chairman Bruce Landsberg chose to look at the big picture. If we focus on Aska’s human failings, on the legacy of his lie, we miss the real safety lessons. How many other pilots just like Conrad Jules Aska are out there right now, one accidental go-around mode activation away from disaster? The responsibility to keep them out of airline cockpits must lie with the system itself — and Landsberg believed that that system failed. Regarding the FAA’s long-delayed implementation of the pilot records database, he wrote, “I can see no good reason as to why it should have taken that long.” Addressing industry pushback, he added, “If you think monitoring, training or getting a solid background check on a prospective pilot candidate is expensive, try having an accident.”
Covid with a side of mandates probably culled the herd. Lot of industries are playing catch up. Like construction. It's pathetic these days.
Wasn't Teneriffe a runway collision? In the 70s
Anyway my weekly flights to Spokane are done for now. So I'm good
He was KLM’s chief pilot. The training standards and technical infrastructure of that era are way behind today.
And it still doesn’t happen if not for 20 other coincidences. Ultimately he fucked up but the contributing factors to that disaster are off the charts.
In the 2020s go-arounds and aborted takeoffs make almost as much news as disasters did 30+ years ago.
The recent revelations about hiring practices for air traffic controllers and pilots has me more concerned for the future. I see it getting worse. -
That's too bad because the Throbber would have treated you to the finest meats and cheeses and hookers and blow East Sprague could provide.RaceBannon said:
Quite honestly I don't disagreewhlinder said:"It seems like" is a great anecdotal approach to evaluating a system which has plenty of passenger safety statistics over a long period of time. It's nice that plane tracking and radar software is now accessible to the masses so these things can come to light and the system can continue to improve. However, I can also promise you runway conflicts forcing go-arounds occurred way before the past 3 years. Anecdotally. I've seen it. Is it worse statistically? I honestly don't know.
Hiring practices were an issue before COVID and aren't related to equity, whatever that means. Atlas Air 3591 is the clear example of this. An apparently qualified First Officer, getting through the hiring and training process, sending a 767 straight into the water because he can't maintain situational awareness. That rests with the system to identify in its hiring and training practices in the context of a labor shortage. I strongly doubt the system has been loosened to make it easier to get into a pilot seat in the past 3 years; hopefully the gaps identified through that disaster have been addressed.
https://admiralcloudberg.medium.com/legacy-of-a-lie-the-crash-of-atlas-air-flight-3591-519a3a7bd6ecIn an addendum to the report, NTSB Vice Chairman Bruce Landsberg chose to look at the big picture. If we focus on Aska’s human failings, on the legacy of his lie, we miss the real safety lessons. How many other pilots just like Conrad Jules Aska are out there right now, one accidental go-around mode activation away from disaster? The responsibility to keep them out of airline cockpits must lie with the system itself — and Landsberg believed that that system failed. Regarding the FAA’s long-delayed implementation of the pilot records database, he wrote, “I can see no good reason as to why it should have taken that long.” Addressing industry pushback, he added, “If you think monitoring, training or getting a solid background check on a prospective pilot candidate is expensive, try having an accident.”
Covid with a side of mandates probably culled the herd. Lot of industries are playing catch up. Like construction. It's pathetic these days.
Wasn't Teneriffe a runway collision? In the 70s
Anyway my weekly flights to Spokane are done for now. So I'm good
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Apparently you East siders are a bit soft. The owner was loving how I whipped the place into shape but grown ass men said I was mean. Behind my backPurpleThrobber said:
That's too bad because the Throbber would have treated you to the finest meats and cheeses and hookers and blow East Sprague could provide.RaceBannon said:
Quite honestly I don't disagreewhlinder said:"It seems like" is a great anecdotal approach to evaluating a system which has plenty of passenger safety statistics over a long period of time. It's nice that plane tracking and radar software is now accessible to the masses so these things can come to light and the system can continue to improve. However, I can also promise you runway conflicts forcing go-arounds occurred way before the past 3 years. Anecdotally. I've seen it. Is it worse statistically? I honestly don't know.
Hiring practices were an issue before COVID and aren't related to equity, whatever that means. Atlas Air 3591 is the clear example of this. An apparently qualified First Officer, getting through the hiring and training process, sending a 767 straight into the water because he can't maintain situational awareness. That rests with the system to identify in its hiring and training practices in the context of a labor shortage. I strongly doubt the system has been loosened to make it easier to get into a pilot seat in the past 3 years; hopefully the gaps identified through that disaster have been addressed.
https://admiralcloudberg.medium.com/legacy-of-a-lie-the-crash-of-atlas-air-flight-3591-519a3a7bd6ecIn an addendum to the report, NTSB Vice Chairman Bruce Landsberg chose to look at the big picture. If we focus on Aska’s human failings, on the legacy of his lie, we miss the real safety lessons. How many other pilots just like Conrad Jules Aska are out there right now, one accidental go-around mode activation away from disaster? The responsibility to keep them out of airline cockpits must lie with the system itself — and Landsberg believed that that system failed. Regarding the FAA’s long-delayed implementation of the pilot records database, he wrote, “I can see no good reason as to why it should have taken that long.” Addressing industry pushback, he added, “If you think monitoring, training or getting a solid background check on a prospective pilot candidate is expensive, try having an accident.”
Covid with a side of mandates probably culled the herd. Lot of industries are playing catch up. Like construction. It's pathetic these days.
Wasn't Teneriffe a runway collision? In the 70s
Anyway my weekly flights to Spokane are done for now. So I'm good
Always easier to fire the coach. Or move me to another fire. Back on the wet side -
I haven't seen anything about hiring practice changes; as I said before the system exists to ensure qualified pilots are identified and trained. The legislation 15 years ago to require 1500 flight hours ensures a higher level of experience amongst the application pool than at any point before that, while also contributing to the shortage.46XiJCAB said:
I've been on two aborted landings due to traffic on the runway. Neither I'm sure made the news. One in Philadelphia the other San Francisco. The one in SF I thought was the end. A DC-10 aborting a landing over the runway makes you appreciate a good pilot and the structural integrity and power of a modern airliner.whlinder said:
Yes, in the 1970s before crew resource management was a thing.46XiJCAB said:
Tenerife was a highly skilled senior 747 pilot deciding he was tired of waiting and just decided to roll in the fog without clearance.whlinder said:
Yes Tenerife was in the mid-70s. Terrible event but needed like 30 things to go wrong for that to happen. Far more relevant was the LAX runway crash in the 90s where the controller basically forgot that a prop plane was told to taxi onto the runway and hold while a 737 was cleared to land. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Los_Angeles_runway_disasterRaceBannon said:
Quite honestly I don't disagreewhlinder said:"It seems like" is a great anecdotal approach to evaluating a system which has plenty of passenger safety statistics over a long period of time. It's nice that plane tracking and radar software is now accessible to the masses so these things can come to light and the system can continue to improve. However, I can also promise you runway conflicts forcing go-arounds occurred way before the past 3 years. Anecdotally. I've seen it. Is it worse statistically? I honestly don't know.
Hiring practices were an issue before COVID and aren't related to equity, whatever that means. Atlas Air 3591 is the clear example of this. An apparently qualified First Officer, getting through the hiring and training process, sending a 767 straight into the water because he can't maintain situational awareness. That rests with the system to identify in its hiring and training practices in the context of a labor shortage. I strongly doubt the system has been loosened to make it easier to get into a pilot seat in the past 3 years; hopefully the gaps identified through that disaster have been addressed.
https://admiralcloudberg.medium.com/legacy-of-a-lie-the-crash-of-atlas-air-flight-3591-519a3a7bd6ecIn an addendum to the report, NTSB Vice Chairman Bruce Landsberg chose to look at the big picture. If we focus on Aska’s human failings, on the legacy of his lie, we miss the real safety lessons. How many other pilots just like Conrad Jules Aska are out there right now, one accidental go-around mode activation away from disaster? The responsibility to keep them out of airline cockpits must lie with the system itself — and Landsberg believed that that system failed. Regarding the FAA’s long-delayed implementation of the pilot records database, he wrote, “I can see no good reason as to why it should have taken that long.” Addressing industry pushback, he added, “If you think monitoring, training or getting a solid background check on a prospective pilot candidate is expensive, try having an accident.”
Covid with a side of mandates probably culled the herd. Lot of industries are playing catch up. Like construction. It's pathetic these days.
Wasn't Teneriffe a runway collision? In the 70s
Anyway my weekly flights to Spokane are done for now. So I'm good
He was KLM’s chief pilot. The training standards and technical infrastructure of that era are way behind today.
And it still doesn’t happen if not for 20 other coincidences. Ultimately he fucked up but the contributing factors to that disaster are off the charts.
In the 2020s go-arounds and aborted takeoffs make almost as much news as disasters did 30+ years ago.
The recent revelations about hiring practices for air traffic controllers and pilots has me more concerned for the future. I see it getting worse.
ATC hiring may be a different story; I've heard some staffing anecdotes there but the ATC is constrained by technology at this point.
I've had my share of aborted landings too. Aircraft are built incredibly well except when Boeing decides to fuck up their software. I feel completely safe on commercial aircraft virtually anywhere in the world. (Intra-Africa travel is something). -
Fuck me opening this thread while flying home from Detroit.
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You heard about the co-pilot who crashed the Amazon Prime 767 into a Houston lake on approach? Tragic that he was at the controls of an aircraft.whlinder said:
I haven't seen anything about hiring practice changes; as I said before the system exists to ensure qualified pilots are identified and trained. The legislation 15 years ago to require 1500 flight hours ensures a higher level of experience amongst the application pool than at any point before that, while also contributing to the shortage.46XiJCAB said:
I've been on two aborted landings due to traffic on the runway. Neither I'm sure made the news. One in Philadelphia the other San Francisco. The one in SF I thought was the end. A DC-10 aborting a landing over the runway makes you appreciate a good pilot and the structural integrity and power of a modern airliner.whlinder said:
Yes, in the 1970s before crew resource management was a thing.46XiJCAB said:
Tenerife was a highly skilled senior 747 pilot deciding he was tired of waiting and just decided to roll in the fog without clearance.whlinder said:
Yes Tenerife was in the mid-70s. Terrible event but needed like 30 things to go wrong for that to happen. Far more relevant was the LAX runway crash in the 90s where the controller basically forgot that a prop plane was told to taxi onto the runway and hold while a 737 was cleared to land. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Los_Angeles_runway_disasterRaceBannon said:
Quite honestly I don't disagreewhlinder said:"It seems like" is a great anecdotal approach to evaluating a system which has plenty of passenger safety statistics over a long period of time. It's nice that plane tracking and radar software is now accessible to the masses so these things can come to light and the system can continue to improve. However, I can also promise you runway conflicts forcing go-arounds occurred way before the past 3 years. Anecdotally. I've seen it. Is it worse statistically? I honestly don't know.
Hiring practices were an issue before COVID and aren't related to equity, whatever that means. Atlas Air 3591 is the clear example of this. An apparently qualified First Officer, getting through the hiring and training process, sending a 767 straight into the water because he can't maintain situational awareness. That rests with the system to identify in its hiring and training practices in the context of a labor shortage. I strongly doubt the system has been loosened to make it easier to get into a pilot seat in the past 3 years; hopefully the gaps identified through that disaster have been addressed.
https://admiralcloudberg.medium.com/legacy-of-a-lie-the-crash-of-atlas-air-flight-3591-519a3a7bd6ecIn an addendum to the report, NTSB Vice Chairman Bruce Landsberg chose to look at the big picture. If we focus on Aska’s human failings, on the legacy of his lie, we miss the real safety lessons. How many other pilots just like Conrad Jules Aska are out there right now, one accidental go-around mode activation away from disaster? The responsibility to keep them out of airline cockpits must lie with the system itself — and Landsberg believed that that system failed. Regarding the FAA’s long-delayed implementation of the pilot records database, he wrote, “I can see no good reason as to why it should have taken that long.” Addressing industry pushback, he added, “If you think monitoring, training or getting a solid background check on a prospective pilot candidate is expensive, try having an accident.”
Covid with a side of mandates probably culled the herd. Lot of industries are playing catch up. Like construction. It's pathetic these days.
Wasn't Teneriffe a runway collision? In the 70s
Anyway my weekly flights to Spokane are done for now. So I'm good
He was KLM’s chief pilot. The training standards and technical infrastructure of that era are way behind today.
And it still doesn’t happen if not for 20 other coincidences. Ultimately he fucked up but the contributing factors to that disaster are off the charts.
In the 2020s go-arounds and aborted takeoffs make almost as much news as disasters did 30+ years ago.
The recent revelations about hiring practices for air traffic controllers and pilots has me more concerned for the future. I see it getting worse.
ATC hiring may be a different story; I've heard some staffing anecdotes there but the ATC is constrained by technology at this point.
I've had my share of aborted landings too. Aircraft are built incredibly well except when Boeing decides to fuck up their software. I feel completely safe on commercial aircraft virtually anywhere in the world. (Intra-Africa travel is something). -
So glad medical schools are eroding silly standards like test scores to satisfy equity requirements. If I'm under the knife or undergoing cancer treatment, I don't care about merit, equity is much more important.SFGbob said:Showing up on time.
Hard work
Self reliance
Respect authority
Delaying gratification
Merit based standards
All signs of white supremacy.
