Breaking the conversions based on distance type I broke into 3 categories:
Short Yardage: 3rd and 3 or less Mid Yardage: 3rd and 4 to 3rd and 7 Long Yardage: 3rd and 8 or more
Short Yardage:
28 of 36 for a conversion rate of 78%
15 of 36 of those conversions were pass plays (42% of our play calls were passes)
Of those 15 pass plays, we converted on 9 of them (60% conversion rate)
Of the 21 run attempts that we had in these situations, we converted on 19 of them
Mid Yardage:
21 of 51 for a conversion rate of 41%
43 of 51 of those conversions were pass plays (84% of our play calls were passes)
Of those 43 pass plays, 17 of them were converted (39.5% conversion rate)
Of the 8 run attempts, 4 of those attempts were converted
Long Yardage:
11 of 51 for a conversion rate of 22%
46 of 51 conversions were pass plays (90% of the play calls)
All 11 conversions were via pass (converted on 24% of the pass calls)
The 5 attempts were largely throw away calls (3rd and 19 at Rutgers, 3rd and 9 at Colorado in 4th quarter up a bunch, 3rd and 26 at ASU, 3rd and 8 vs Utah, 3rd and 19 vs Pedo)
One of the things that I thought would be worth looking into was what things looked like early in the season and late in the season using the ASU game as a time period where "things changed" with our offense … the results actually support that:
Season up to and including the ASU Game:
Short Yardage:
14 of 18 for a conversion rate of 78%
10 of 18 of those conversions were pass plays (56% of our play calls were passes)
Of those 10 pass plays, we converted on 6 of them (60% conversion rate)
Of the 8 run attempts that we had in these situations, we converted all of them
Mid Yardage:
11 of 28 for a conversion rate of 39%
23 of 28 of those conversions were pass plays (82% of our play calls were passes)
Of those 23 pass plays, 9 of them were converted (39.1% conversion rate)
Of the 5 run attempts, 2 of those attempts were converted
Long Yardage:
9 of 30 for a conversion rate of 30%
27 of 30 conversions were pass plays (90% of the play calls)
All 9 conversions were via pass (converted on 33% of the pass calls)
One of the things that I thought would be worth looking into was what things looked like early in the season and late in the season using the ASU game as a time period where "things changed" with our offense … the results actually support that:
Season after the ASU Game:
Short Yardage:
14 of 18 for a conversion rate of 78%
5 of 18 of those attempts were pass plays (28% of our play calls were passes)
Of those 5 pass plays, we converted on 3 of them (60% conversion rate)
Of the 13 run attempts that we had in these situations, we converted 11 of them
Mid Yardage:
10 of 23 for a conversion rate of 43.5%
20 of 23 of those attempts were pass plays (87% of our play calls were passes)
Of those 20 pass plays, 8 of them were converted (40% conversion rate)
Of the 3 run attempts, 2 of those attempts were converted
Long Yardage:
2 of 21 for a conversion rate of 9.5%
19 of 21 conversions were pass plays (90% of the play calls)
All 2 conversions were via pass (converted on 10.5% of the pass calls)
Definition of clutch … and to think that the 1.2 yards against ASU includes a 25 yard or so gain to Coleman on a play that was the definition of broken … it's just amazingly piss poor how bad the offensive performance was in that game
1) After the ASU game, at least in short yardage situation, there was an increased focus on running the ball
2) The play calling was heavy passing on anything outside of 3rd and 3 or less … that's an area where running the ball with more emphasis in both short- and mid-yardage situations could be an opportunity for improvement
3) Early down play calling is another area for major improvement as the balance of 3rd down conversions were mid- and long-yardage situations (short-yardage situations accounted for only 26% of our total 3rd down attempts)
4) A hallmark to me of Babushka's play calling was that he'd panic in situations where the offense got behind the chains trying to get too much of it back … to me that is a big factor in why the pass ratio was so high even though the numbers may not have supported the actual results
5) Browning takes sacks at a really high ratio on downs where he's forced to pass with distance. A lot of his weaknesses come out in these situations. This is also an issue that I suspect also plays out in looking at situations like throwing on 2nd and 9 or whatnot in that instead of taking the drop down pass to get a 4-6 yard gain getting in a much more favorable 3rd down situation he's much more likely to try to get it all back on 1 play and that then leaves these longer 3rd down situations.
6) Particularly after the ASU game, the WR/Bryant injuries combined with Browning's weaknesses basically turned 3rd and long into automatic punt situations
What does that mean for 2018 and the change from Babushka and Bush:
1) There's a lot of opportunity for Bush to come in and with some very small tweaks make some significant gains
2) We convert at a very high rate in 3rd and short situations … focusing the offense in a manner to ensure that we're playing to that strength is a huge win compared to Babushka … Babushka's offense (particularly last year) required the team to be picking up big chunks of yards … many scoring drives had limited, if any, 3rd down conversions. Particularly against good teams, 3rd down conversions are vital and will definitely be against Auburn. Getting into good down/distance situations will be important.
3) Being more willing to run the ball even in mid-yardage situations not only will take advantage of our best offensive players, will likely play better with what the stats/data tells us, but also potentially help the passing game in those situations. Because Babushka did not show a willingness to run, it made it much easier for defenses to drop behind the sticks and magnify Browning's inability to throw with relative anticipation given his lack of arm strength. Forcing defenses to better honor the run will potentially make those pass attempts a little easier for Browning
4) Playing to our team strengths (running game and defense) may result in some additional opportunities to take positive plays on 3rd and long on the ground versus risking disaster as Browning's yet to show a strong willingness on those situations to take say half the yardage and gain field position. Instead, it's more likely that he's going to run around trying to be Fran Tarkenton (he isn't) and take a negative play as looking at many of those sack situations they usually are coming not from our OL getting beat easily but more because of coverage and Browning holding the ball too long. Getting Browning to understand the internal clock and taking the drop down pass can also help.
1) After the ASU game, at least in short yardage situation, there was an increased focus on running the ball
2) The play calling was heavy passing on anything outside of 3rd and 3 or less … that's an area where running the ball with more emphasis in both short- and mid-yardage situations could be an opportunity for improvement
3) Early down play calling is another area for major improvement as the balance of 3rd down conversions were mid- and long-yardage situations (short-yardage situations accounted for only 26% of our total 3rd down attempts)
4) A hallmark to me of Babushka's play calling was that he'd panic in situations where the offense got behind the chains trying to get too much of it back … to me that is a big factor in why the pass ratio was so high even though the numbers may not have supported the actual results
5) Browning takes sacks at a really high ratio on downs where he's forced to pass with distance. A lot of his weaknesses come out in these situations. This is also an issue that I suspect also plays out in looking at situations like throwing on 2nd and 9 or whatnot in that instead of taking the drop down pass to get a 4-6 yard gain getting in a much more favorable 3rd down situation he's much more likely to try to get it all back on 1 play and that then leaves these longer 3rd down situations.
6) Particularly after the ASU game, the WR/Bryant injuries combined with Browning's weaknesses basically turned 3rd and long into automatic punt situations
What does that mean for 2018 and the change from Babushka and Bush:
1) There's a lot of opportunity for Bush to come in and with some very small tweaks make some significant gains
2) We convert at a very high rate in 3rd and short situations … focusing the offense in a manner to ensure that we're playing to that strength is a huge win compared to Babushka … Babushka's offense (particularly last year) required the team to be picking up big chunks of yards … many scoring drives had limited, if any, 3rd down conversions. Particularly against good teams, 3rd down conversions are vital and will definitely be against Auburn. Getting into good down/distance situations will be important.
3) Being more willing to run the ball even in mid-yardage situations not only will take advantage of our best offensive players, will likely play better with what the stats/data tells us, but also potentially help the passing game in those situations. Because Babushka did not show a willingness to run, it made it much easier for defenses to drop behind the sticks and magnify Browning's inability to throw with relative anticipation given his lack of arm strength. Forcing defenses to better honor the run will potentially make those pass attempts a little easier for Browning
4) Playing to our team strengths (running game and defense) may result in some additional opportunities to take positive plays on 3rd and long on the ground versus risking disaster as Browning's yet to show a strong willingness on those situations to take say half the yardage and gain field position. Instead, it's more likely that he's going to run around trying to be Fran Tarkenton (he isn't) and take a negative play as looking at many of those sack situations they usually are coming not from our OL getting beat easily but more because of coverage and Browning holding the ball too long. Getting Browning to understand the internal clock and taking the drop down pass can also help.
Even if it's the drop down pass getting the ball in the hands of some of our playmakers(Gaskin, Salvon, Chico) gives them a chance to beat a man and potentially pick up the conversion. Even if it's not optimal it's far better than watching Jake try to do it or taking a deep sack.
1) After the ASU game, at least in short yardage situation, there was an increased focus on running the ball
2) The play calling was heavy passing on anything outside of 3rd and 3 or less … that's an area where running the ball with more emphasis in both short- and mid-yardage situations could be an opportunity for improvement
3) Early down play calling is another area for major improvement as the balance of 3rd down conversions were mid- and long-yardage situations (short-yardage situations accounted for only 26% of our total 3rd down attempts)
4) A hallmark to me of Babushka's play calling was that he'd panic in situations where the offense got behind the chains trying to get too much of it back … to me that is a big factor in why the pass ratio was so high even though the numbers may not have supported the actual results
5) Browning takes sacks at a really high ratio on downs where he's forced to pass with distance. A lot of his weaknesses come out in these situations. This is also an issue that I suspect also plays out in looking at situations like throwing on 2nd and 9 or whatnot in that instead of taking the drop down pass to get a 4-6 yard gain getting in a much more favorable 3rd down situation he's much more likely to try to get it all back on 1 play and that then leaves these longer 3rd down situations.
6) Particularly after the ASU game, the WR/Bryant injuries combined with Browning's weaknesses basically turned 3rd and long into automatic punt situations
What does that mean for 2018 and the change from Babushka and Bush:
1) There's a lot of opportunity for Bush to come in and with some very small tweaks make some significant gains
2) We convert at a very high rate in 3rd and short situations … focusing the offense in a manner to ensure that we're playing to that strength is a huge win compared to Babushka … Babushka's offense (particularly last year) required the team to be picking up big chunks of yards … many scoring drives had limited, if any, 3rd down conversions. Particularly against good teams, 3rd down conversions are vital and will definitely be against Auburn. Getting into good down/distance situations will be important.
3) Being more willing to run the ball even in mid-yardage situations not only will take advantage of our best offensive players, will likely play better with what the stats/data tells us, but also potentially help the passing game in those situations. Because Babushka did not show a willingness to run, it made it much easier for defenses to drop behind the sticks and magnify Browning's inability to throw with relative anticipation given his lack of arm strength. Forcing defenses to better honor the run will potentially make those pass attempts a little easier for Browning
4) Playing to our team strengths (running game and defense) may result in some additional opportunities to take positive plays on 3rd and long on the ground versus risking disaster as Browning's yet to show a strong willingness on those situations to take say half the yardage and gain field position. Instead, it's more likely that he's going to run around trying to be Fran Tarkenton (he isn't) and take a negative play as looking at many of those sack situations they usually are coming not from our OL getting beat easily but more because of coverage and Browning holding the ball too long. Getting Browning to understand the internal clock and taking the drop down pass can also help.
It is fun to make fun of how brevity challenged you are, but this summary is excellent.
Even if you could have said it more clearly with 20%30% 40% fewer words.
Comments
Short Yardage: 3rd and 3 or less
Mid Yardage: 3rd and 4 to 3rd and 7
Long Yardage: 3rd and 8 or more
Short Yardage:
- 28 of 36 for a conversion rate of 78%
- 15 of 36 of those conversions were pass plays (42% of our play calls were passes)
- Of those 15 pass plays, we converted on 9 of them (60% conversion rate)
- Of the 21 run attempts that we had in these situations, we converted on 19 of them
Mid Yardage:- 21 of 51 for a conversion rate of 41%
- 43 of 51 of those conversions were pass plays (84% of our play calls were passes)
- Of those 43 pass plays, 17 of them were converted (39.5% conversion rate)
- Of the 8 run attempts, 4 of those attempts were converted
Long Yardage:Season up to and including the ASU Game:
Short Yardage:
- 14 of 18 for a conversion rate of 78%
- 10 of 18 of those conversions were pass plays (56% of our play calls were passes)
- Of those 10 pass plays, we converted on 6 of them (60% conversion rate)
- Of the 8 run attempts that we had in these situations, we converted all of them
Mid Yardage:- 11 of 28 for a conversion rate of 39%
- 23 of 28 of those conversions were pass plays (82% of our play calls were passes)
- Of those 23 pass plays, 9 of them were converted (39.1% conversion rate)
- Of the 5 run attempts, 2 of those attempts were converted
Long Yardage:Season after the ASU Game:
Short Yardage:
- 14 of 18 for a conversion rate of 78%
- 5 of 18 of those attempts were pass plays (28% of our play calls were passes)
- Of those 5 pass plays, we converted on 3 of them (60% conversion rate)
- Of the 13 run attempts that we had in these situations, we converted 11 of them
Mid Yardage:- 10 of 23 for a conversion rate of 43.5%
- 20 of 23 of those attempts were pass plays (87% of our play calls were passes)
- Of those 20 pass plays, 8 of them were converted (40% conversion rate)
- Of the 3 run attempts, 2 of those attempts were converted
Long Yardage:14 total sacks on 3rd down
1) After the ASU game, at least in short yardage situation, there was an increased focus on running the ball
2) The play calling was heavy passing on anything outside of 3rd and 3 or less … that's an area where running the ball with more emphasis in both short- and mid-yardage situations could be an opportunity for improvement
3) Early down play calling is another area for major improvement as the balance of 3rd down conversions were mid- and long-yardage situations (short-yardage situations accounted for only 26% of our total 3rd down attempts)
4) A hallmark to me of Babushka's play calling was that he'd panic in situations where the offense got behind the chains trying to get too much of it back … to me that is a big factor in why the pass ratio was so high even though the numbers may not have supported the actual results
5) Browning takes sacks at a really high ratio on downs where he's forced to pass with distance. A lot of his weaknesses come out in these situations. This is also an issue that I suspect also plays out in looking at situations like throwing on 2nd and 9 or whatnot in that instead of taking the drop down pass to get a 4-6 yard gain getting in a much more favorable 3rd down situation he's much more likely to try to get it all back on 1 play and that then leaves these longer 3rd down situations.
6) Particularly after the ASU game, the WR/Bryant injuries combined with Browning's weaknesses basically turned 3rd and long into automatic punt situations
What does that mean for 2018 and the change from Babushka and Bush:
1) There's a lot of opportunity for Bush to come in and with some very small tweaks make some significant gains
2) We convert at a very high rate in 3rd and short situations … focusing the offense in a manner to ensure that we're playing to that strength is a huge win compared to Babushka … Babushka's offense (particularly last year) required the team to be picking up big chunks of yards … many scoring drives had limited, if any, 3rd down conversions. Particularly against good teams, 3rd down conversions are vital and will definitely be against Auburn. Getting into good down/distance situations will be important.
3) Being more willing to run the ball even in mid-yardage situations not only will take advantage of our best offensive players, will likely play better with what the stats/data tells us, but also potentially help the passing game in those situations. Because Babushka did not show a willingness to run, it made it much easier for defenses to drop behind the sticks and magnify Browning's inability to throw with relative anticipation given his lack of arm strength. Forcing defenses to better honor the run will potentially make those pass attempts a little easier for Browning
4) Playing to our team strengths (running game and defense) may result in some additional opportunities to take positive plays on 3rd and long on the ground versus risking disaster as Browning's yet to show a strong willingness on those situations to take say half the yardage and gain field position. Instead, it's more likely that he's going to run around trying to be Fran Tarkenton (he isn't) and take a negative play as looking at many of those sack situations they usually are coming not from our OL getting beat easily but more because of coverage and Browning holding the ball too long. Getting Browning to understand the internal clock and taking the drop down pass can also help.
Or you can quote my post and see the HTML code.
No drew sample. No Ross. No Chico. Go back and watch 2016.
On defense:
No pass rush. Myles Bryan guarding a receiving tight end.
Answered without the faggoty wall of words.
Even if you could have said it more clearly with
20%30%40% fewer words.Tequila.
You need to discover girls.