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America, War and the Atlantic by George Friedman
DerekJohnson
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America, War and the Atlantic
Thoughts in and around geopolitics.
By: George Friedman
On Aug. 1, 1914, Germany declared war on Russia. Two days later, Germany declared war on France. The following day, Britain declared war on Germany, and then on Aug. 6, the Austro-Hungarian Empire declared war on Russia. Within a week, Britain would declare war on Austria-Hungary.
Germany unified in 1871, and in doing so emerged as an economic powerhouse. It rapidly outstripped France, and by the end of the century it was challenging Britain. With economic growth came power. Germany was aware of the anxiety it was creating in Europe, and it reasonably believed that a simultaneous attack by Britain, France and Russia would crush it. It chose to launch a preemptive war, assuming this would throw them off balance and set the stage for a negotiation guaranteeing Germany’s status. The Austro-Hungarian Empire saw value in its relationship with Germany and opportunities to expand into Russia. The British declared war on Austria-Hungary to give Russia a sense of being part of a powerful coalition and to prevent a Russian truce with Germany.
Which is all to say that the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand didn’t trigger the war; the war had been well planned by all the parties over the years. The killing was simply occasion to begin the planned operations. The war was hardwired – like many wars, it was expected to be a short affair. It wasn’t. No one trusted the other enough to make concessions needed to wage peace, and as a result somewhere between 15 million and 20 million people died.
The United States got involved in 1917, after the Russian czar was overthrown. The Americans feared that Russia would abandon the war and that German troops would be massed in the west, with France overrun and Britain facing the German navy. Washington feared that a victorious Germany would come to dominate the Atlantic and threaten the United States. When German U-boats sank the Lusitania, American fears were confirmed. U.S. troops were sent to France, where some 100,000 were killed. The U.S. did not itself win the war, but it prevented the Anglo-French alliance from losing it. Afterward, the U.S. withdrew from Europe, assuming the defeat of Germany had ended the tale.
Of course, European tales do not end so neatly. In the 1930s, Germany rearmed, then conquered France and invaded Russia. The United States followed the World War I strategy, focused on retaining control of the Atlantic. It supplied Britain with the means to wage war in the Atlantic, in return for Britain leasing most of its bases in the Western Hemisphere to the United States and guaranteeing that, in the event of British defeat, the British fleet would sail to North American ports. Washington did not get involved in European operations until 1943, and not in decisive operations until 1944. For the United States, the European peninsula was a means to defend the Atlantic, which could shield it from foreign attacks, not in itself crucial to its national security. About 50 million people died in the war.
This time, the U.S. did not withdraw when the war was over. It saw a threat from Russia forming and, having lost confidence in the ability of the Europeans to defend themselves, saw itself as Europe’s security guarantor, not as an act of chivalry but as a means of maintaining primacy in the Atlantic. Most saw the Cold War as a potential land war against Russia. This misses the strategic point. Europe could not defend itself, and the full force needed to block a Russian attack couldn’t be stationed there. In the event of a Russian attack, the U.S. would send large convoys of men, equipment and supplies, and the convoys would continue to supply NATO forces throughout the war.
The primary Russian strategy would be to destroy or block U.S. shipping across the Atlantic. A submarine force and long-range, supersonic aircraft were deployed to carry out the mission. The U.S. prepared a force of aircraft carriers, anti-submarine systems and anti-air, anti-missile systems to protect the convoys. If the Russians closed the Atlantic, they would win the war. If they did not, they would lose it. The first significant battle would not be in Germany but off the Icelandic coast.
In each of the world wars and then in the Cold War, command of the Atlantic was critical, both to project forces to Europe and to block potential attacks on the American mainland. The fear was that a European power might defeat its enemies and take advantage of European technology and production to create a fleet that could challenge the U.S. in the Atlantic. It seems like a far-fetched threat now, but Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt and every president who held office during the Cold War understood that the oceans were American essentials, even in a nuclear war.
The U.S. drew several conclusions from the two world wars. First, Europeans cannot be trusted to create a prudent defense – nor avoid devouring themselves. Second, it learned that in the end, Europe's irresponsibility would force the U.S. to become involved. Third, wars that appear to be short will turn out to be long. Fourth, the possibility of a threat to the Atlantic as a byproduct of continental war is real. Fifth, early intervention in wars will save American lives, while late interventions will cost them. And finally, in all wars there is a threat to the Atlantic and therefore to the homeland.
Once a European power becomes militarily aggressive, it is forced to become even more aggressive after a victory because the next danger is just over the mountain. Ultimately, the U.S. will be forced to be in Europe. Whether leaders see this I don’t know, but if they are acting only by habit in Ukraine, it flows from American grand strategy. Habit is a substitute for strategy when the rules don’t change.
Thoughts in and around geopolitics.
By: George Friedman
On Aug. 1, 1914, Germany declared war on Russia. Two days later, Germany declared war on France. The following day, Britain declared war on Germany, and then on Aug. 6, the Austro-Hungarian Empire declared war on Russia. Within a week, Britain would declare war on Austria-Hungary.
Germany unified in 1871, and in doing so emerged as an economic powerhouse. It rapidly outstripped France, and by the end of the century it was challenging Britain. With economic growth came power. Germany was aware of the anxiety it was creating in Europe, and it reasonably believed that a simultaneous attack by Britain, France and Russia would crush it. It chose to launch a preemptive war, assuming this would throw them off balance and set the stage for a negotiation guaranteeing Germany’s status. The Austro-Hungarian Empire saw value in its relationship with Germany and opportunities to expand into Russia. The British declared war on Austria-Hungary to give Russia a sense of being part of a powerful coalition and to prevent a Russian truce with Germany.
Which is all to say that the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand didn’t trigger the war; the war had been well planned by all the parties over the years. The killing was simply occasion to begin the planned operations. The war was hardwired – like many wars, it was expected to be a short affair. It wasn’t. No one trusted the other enough to make concessions needed to wage peace, and as a result somewhere between 15 million and 20 million people died.
The United States got involved in 1917, after the Russian czar was overthrown. The Americans feared that Russia would abandon the war and that German troops would be massed in the west, with France overrun and Britain facing the German navy. Washington feared that a victorious Germany would come to dominate the Atlantic and threaten the United States. When German U-boats sank the Lusitania, American fears were confirmed. U.S. troops were sent to France, where some 100,000 were killed. The U.S. did not itself win the war, but it prevented the Anglo-French alliance from losing it. Afterward, the U.S. withdrew from Europe, assuming the defeat of Germany had ended the tale.
Of course, European tales do not end so neatly. In the 1930s, Germany rearmed, then conquered France and invaded Russia. The United States followed the World War I strategy, focused on retaining control of the Atlantic. It supplied Britain with the means to wage war in the Atlantic, in return for Britain leasing most of its bases in the Western Hemisphere to the United States and guaranteeing that, in the event of British defeat, the British fleet would sail to North American ports. Washington did not get involved in European operations until 1943, and not in decisive operations until 1944. For the United States, the European peninsula was a means to defend the Atlantic, which could shield it from foreign attacks, not in itself crucial to its national security. About 50 million people died in the war.
This time, the U.S. did not withdraw when the war was over. It saw a threat from Russia forming and, having lost confidence in the ability of the Europeans to defend themselves, saw itself as Europe’s security guarantor, not as an act of chivalry but as a means of maintaining primacy in the Atlantic. Most saw the Cold War as a potential land war against Russia. This misses the strategic point. Europe could not defend itself, and the full force needed to block a Russian attack couldn’t be stationed there. In the event of a Russian attack, the U.S. would send large convoys of men, equipment and supplies, and the convoys would continue to supply NATO forces throughout the war.
The primary Russian strategy would be to destroy or block U.S. shipping across the Atlantic. A submarine force and long-range, supersonic aircraft were deployed to carry out the mission. The U.S. prepared a force of aircraft carriers, anti-submarine systems and anti-air, anti-missile systems to protect the convoys. If the Russians closed the Atlantic, they would win the war. If they did not, they would lose it. The first significant battle would not be in Germany but off the Icelandic coast.
In each of the world wars and then in the Cold War, command of the Atlantic was critical, both to project forces to Europe and to block potential attacks on the American mainland. The fear was that a European power might defeat its enemies and take advantage of European technology and production to create a fleet that could challenge the U.S. in the Atlantic. It seems like a far-fetched threat now, but Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt and every president who held office during the Cold War understood that the oceans were American essentials, even in a nuclear war.
The U.S. drew several conclusions from the two world wars. First, Europeans cannot be trusted to create a prudent defense – nor avoid devouring themselves. Second, it learned that in the end, Europe's irresponsibility would force the U.S. to become involved. Third, wars that appear to be short will turn out to be long. Fourth, the possibility of a threat to the Atlantic as a byproduct of continental war is real. Fifth, early intervention in wars will save American lives, while late interventions will cost them. And finally, in all wars there is a threat to the Atlantic and therefore to the homeland.
Once a European power becomes militarily aggressive, it is forced to become even more aggressive after a victory because the next danger is just over the mountain. Ultimately, the U.S. will be forced to be in Europe. Whether leaders see this I don’t know, but if they are acting only by habit in Ukraine, it flows from American grand strategy. Habit is a substitute for strategy when the rules don’t change.
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Or a picture of Dick Cheney.