I don't have much of an issue with keeping the pressure on until the last of the thugs are out of there
Always have had mixed feelings on the subject. Bay of Pigs or not, Castro letting Khrushchev bring in nukes was an unforgivable offense. That crazy former Giants prospect almost got us? (who were alive at the time) killed. But at the same time, the embargo never really worked and made an convenient excuse for why their standard of living sucked. Furthermore, in spite of there being a large number of Vietnamese and Chinese Americans living on the left coast, an embargo of China or Vietnam in perpetuity wouldn't get one more EC votes.
Why?
Seeking Soviet aid post Bay of Pigs was a logical move to preserve their regime. But how did Castro think we were going to respond? Did he envision that US intelligence wouldn't figure out what was going on and that we would just let them finish up the deployment of the missiles? Yes, after the fact Cuba got the guarantee of no US invasion (and Soviets got the our? missiles out of Turkey) so the gamble worked in hindsight, but it was hardly a forgone conclusion that the crisis could be resolved without WWIII. It was that recklessness that to me was "unforgiveable". Why couldn't a bunch of conventional Soviet military aid been enough to deter a US invasion?
Maybe for similar reasons that we ringed the USSR with nuclear bombers and Titan missiles to deter a Soviet invasion?
And yet, no other strategic move during the Cold War took us quite the brink like that one. Quick disclaimer: I still need to read up on the 1980's and stuff like Perhsing II's in Germany (that book's on my list). Cold war arms race was a chicken/egg thing in my view. Do you think without our building up our post 1949 nuclear deterrence we would have kept the Soviets out of Western Europe? Would the USSR still have tried to build the H Bomb if we had held off and taken the advice a Cal physics prof?
Hint: Kennedy didn't have to respond the way he did. Love how he's lauded for ExComm and collegial model of decisionmaking, but then he tells them not to discuss a diplomatic response, so his initial response ends up needlessly backing Krushchev into a corner. Then, later, he completely end-runs them and makes a deal through Bobby/Dobrynin that ends with a poorly-worded agreement that State hated for not being able to vet at the time, and which led us eight years later to Cienfuegos (which shows the value of making a diplomatic response (yeay Nixon), even though by then the Sovs had achieved nominal parity). But yeah, it's all the Sovs' fault for wanting to redress the strategic imbalance by using allies. Sad!
I'm skeptical of the idea that Kennedy's first option should have to been to reach out to Khrushchev to pursue a diplomatic before announcing the blockade. I don't see how this would have caused the Soviets to change course in time. But I'm open to changing my position based on further evidence. I don't know Cienfuegos as well, but seems like there was more time for diplomacy on that one. I am somewhat of a closet Nixon sympathizer so yay.
So why did the Sov's get to piss and moan about strategic imbalance in nukes, whilst maintain massive conventional superiority in Europe?
We had a 17:1 advantage overall in nuclear yield (and what most at the time would have described as first-strike capability), and we had local conventional superiority in the Caribbean. Kennedy had the luxury of doing anything he liked, and he decided to paint Krushchev into a corner immediately, giving him no honorable way out. People like to say that Krushchev thought that Kennedy was weak, since he spoke firmly to him in Vienna in 1961, but Sov accounts maintain that Krushchev was very impressed with Kennedy and knew he was a strong leader who couldn't be bullied. Kennedy took the Cuban missiles personally, and he made an impulsive and dangerous response. Krushchev's only "crime" was in telling Kennedy during the summer that he wouldn't put missiles in Cuba, then doing it in the fall.
Not going to touch your last querey, since at best it seems a silly rhetorical.
I don't have much of an issue with keeping the pressure on until the last of the thugs are out of there
Always have had mixed feelings on the subject. Bay of Pigs or not, Castro letting Khrushchev bring in nukes was an unforgivable offense. That crazy former Giants prospect almost got us? (who were alive at the time) killed. But at the same time, the embargo never really worked and made an convenient excuse for why their standard of living sucked. Furthermore, in spite of there being a large number of Vietnamese and Chinese Americans living on the left coast, an embargo of China or Vietnam in perpetuity wouldn't get one more EC votes.
Why?
Seeking Soviet aid post Bay of Pigs was a logical move to preserve their regime. But how did Castro think we were going to respond? Did he envision that US intelligence wouldn't figure out what was going on and that we would just let them finish up the deployment of the missiles? Yes, after the fact Cuba got the guarantee of no US invasion (and Soviets got the our? missiles out of Turkey) so the gamble worked in hindsight, but it was hardly a forgone conclusion that the crisis could be resolved without WWIII. It was that recklessness that to me was "unforgiveable". Why couldn't a bunch of conventional Soviet military aid been enough to deter a US invasion?
Maybe for similar reasons that we ringed the USSR with nuclear bombers and Titan missiles to deter a Soviet invasion?
And yet, no other strategic move during the Cold War took us quite the brink like that one. Quick disclaimer: I still need to read up on the 1980's and stuff like Perhsing II's in Germany (that book's on my list). Cold war arms race was a chicken/egg thing in my view. Do you think without our building up our post 1949 nuclear deterrence we would have kept the Soviets out of Western Europe? Would the USSR still have tried to build the H Bomb if we had held off and taken the advice a Cal physics prof?
Hint: Kennedy didn't have to respond the way he did. Love how he's lauded for ExComm and collegial model of decisionmaking, but then he tells them not to discuss a diplomatic response, so his initial response ends up needlessly backing Krushchev into a corner. Then, later, he completely end-runs them and makes a deal through Bobby/Dobrynin that ends with a poorly-worded agreement that State hated for not being able to vet at the time, and which led us eight years later to Cienfuegos (which shows the value of making a diplomatic response (yeay Nixon), even though by then the Sovs had achieved nominal parity). But yeah, it's all the Sovs' fault for wanting to redress the strategic imbalance by using allies. Sad!
I'm skeptical of the idea that Kennedy's first option should have to been to reach out to Khrushchev to pursue a diplomatic before announcing the blockade. I don't see how this would have caused the Soviets to change course in time. But I'm open to changing my position based on further evidence. I don't know Cienfuegos as well, but seems like there was more time for diplomacy on that one. I am somewhat of a closet Nixon sympathizer so yay.
So why did the Sov's get to piss and moan about strategic imbalance in nukes, whilst maintain massive conventional superiority in Europe?
We had a 17:1 advantage overall in nuclear yield (and what most at the time would have described as first-strike capability), and we had local conventional superiority in the Caribbean. Kennedy had the luxury of doing anything he liked, and he decided to paint Krushchev into a corner immediately, giving him no honorable way out. People like to say that Krushchev thought that Kennedy was weak, since he spoke firmly to him in Vienna in 1961, but Sov accounts maintain that Krushchev was very impressed with Kennedy and knew he was a strong leader who couldn't be bullied. Kennedy took the Cuban missiles personally, and he made an impulsive and dangerous response. Krushchev's only "crime" was in telling Kennedy during the summer that he wouldn't put missiles in Cuba, then doing it in the fall.
Not going to touch your last querey, since at best it seems a silly rhetorical.
I don't have much of an issue with keeping the pressure on until the last of the thugs are out of there
Always have had mixed feelings on the subject. Bay of Pigs or not, Castro letting Khrushchev bring in nukes was an unforgivable offense. That crazy former Giants prospect almost got us? (who were alive at the time) killed. But at the same time, the embargo never really worked and made an convenient excuse for why their standard of living sucked. Furthermore, in spite of there being a large number of Vietnamese and Chinese Americans living on the left coast, an embargo of China or Vietnam in perpetuity wouldn't get one more EC votes.
Why?
Seeking Soviet aid post Bay of Pigs was a logical move to preserve their regime. But how did Castro think we were going to respond? Did he envision that US intelligence wouldn't figure out what was going on and that we would just let them finish up the deployment of the missiles? Yes, after the fact Cuba got the guarantee of no US invasion (and Soviets got the our? missiles out of Turkey) so the gamble worked in hindsight, but it was hardly a forgone conclusion that the crisis could be resolved without WWIII. It was that recklessness that to me was "unforgiveable". Why couldn't a bunch of conventional Soviet military aid been enough to deter a US invasion?
Maybe for similar reasons that we ringed the USSR with nuclear bombers and Titan missiles to deter a Soviet invasion?
And yet, no other strategic move during the Cold War took us quite the brink like that one. Quick disclaimer: I still need to read up on the 1980's and stuff like Perhsing II's in Germany (that book's on my list). Cold war arms race was a chicken/egg thing in my view. Do you think without our building up our post 1949 nuclear deterrence we would have kept the Soviets out of Western Europe? Would the USSR still have tried to build the H Bomb if we had held off and taken the advice a Cal physics prof?
Hint: Kennedy didn't have to respond the way he did. Love how he's lauded for ExComm and collegial model of decisionmaking, but then he tells them not to discuss a diplomatic response, so his initial response ends up needlessly backing Krushchev into a corner. Then, later, he completely end-runs them and makes a deal through Bobby/Dobrynin that ends with a poorly-worded agreement that State hated for not being able to vet at the time, and which led us eight years later to Cienfuegos (which shows the value of making a diplomatic response (yeay Nixon), even though by then the Sovs had achieved nominal parity). But yeah, it's all the Sovs' fault for wanting to redress the strategic imbalance by using allies. Sad!
I'm skeptical of the idea that Kennedy's first option should have to been to reach out to Khrushchev to pursue a diplomatic before announcing the blockade. I don't see how this would have caused the Soviets to change course in time. But I'm open to changing my position based on further evidence. I don't know Cienfuegos as well, but seems like there was more time for diplomacy on that one. I am somewhat of a closet Nixon sympathizer so yay.
So why did the Sov's get to piss and moan about strategic imbalance in nukes, whilst maintain massive conventional superiority in Europe?
We had a 17:1 advantage overall in nuclear yield (and what most at the time would have described as first-strike capability), and we had local conventional superiority in the Caribbean. Kennedy had the luxury of doing anything he liked, and he decided to paint Krushchev into a corner immediately, giving him no honorable way out. People like to say that Krushchev thought that Kennedy was weak, since he spoke firmly to him in Vienna in 1961, but Sov accounts maintain that Krushchev was very impressed with Kennedy and knew he was a strong leader who couldn't be bullied. Kennedy took the Cuban missiles personally, and he made an impulsive and dangerous response. Krushchev's only "crime" was in telling Kennedy during the summer that he wouldn't put missiles in Cuba, then doing it in the fall.
Not going to touch your last querey, since at best it seems a silly rhetorical.
A lot of people on the inside back then claimed we were a lot closer to WW3 then was reported. However had Kennedy went with diplomacy, no doubt Kruschev would have demanded removal of most of our Nukes in Western Europe which would have made us weaker and no doubt prompted more agressive proliferation by the Soviets. I think it was the right move not just because the missiles were removed from Cuba but also it allowed us to isolate the Soviets further and break their economy.
I don't have much of an issue with keeping the pressure on until the last of the thugs are out of there
Always have had mixed feelings on the subject. Bay of Pigs or not, Castro letting Khrushchev bring in nukes was an unforgivable offense. That crazy former Giants prospect almost got us? (who were alive at the time) killed. But at the same time, the embargo never really worked and made an convenient excuse for why their standard of living sucked. Furthermore, in spite of there being a large number of Vietnamese and Chinese Americans living on the left coast, an embargo of China or Vietnam in perpetuity wouldn't get one more EC votes.
Why?
Seeking Soviet aid post Bay of Pigs was a logical move to preserve their regime. But how did Castro think we were going to respond? Did he envision that US intelligence wouldn't figure out what was going on and that we would just let them finish up the deployment of the missiles? Yes, after the fact Cuba got the guarantee of no US invasion (and Soviets got the our? missiles out of Turkey) so the gamble worked in hindsight, but it was hardly a forgone conclusion that the crisis could be resolved without WWIII. It was that recklessness that to me was "unforgiveable". Why couldn't a bunch of conventional Soviet military aid been enough to deter a US invasion?
Maybe for similar reasons that we ringed the USSR with nuclear bombers and Titan missiles to deter a Soviet invasion?
And yet, no other strategic move during the Cold War took us quite the brink like that one. Quick disclaimer: I still need to read up on the 1980's and stuff like Perhsing II's in Germany (that book's on my list). Cold war arms race was a chicken/egg thing in my view. Do you think without our building up our post 1949 nuclear deterrence we would have kept the Soviets out of Western Europe? Would the USSR still have tried to build the H Bomb if we had held off and taken the advice a Cal physics prof?
Hint: Kennedy didn't have to respond the way he did. Love how he's lauded for ExComm and collegial model of decisionmaking, but then he tells them not to discuss a diplomatic response, so his initial response ends up needlessly backing Krushchev into a corner. Then, later, he completely end-runs them and makes a deal through Bobby/Dobrynin that ends with a poorly-worded agreement that State hated for not being able to vet at the time, and which led us eight years later to Cienfuegos (which shows the value of making a diplomatic response (yeay Nixon), even though by then the Sovs had achieved nominal parity). But yeah, it's all the Sovs' fault for wanting to redress the strategic imbalance by using allies. Sad!
I'm skeptical of the idea that Kennedy's first option should have to been to reach out to Khrushchev to pursue a diplomatic before announcing the blockade. I don't see how this would have caused the Soviets to change course in time. But I'm open to changing my position based on further evidence. I don't know Cienfuegos as well, but seems like there was more time for diplomacy on that one. I am somewhat of a closet Nixon sympathizer so yay.
So why did the Sov's get to piss and moan about strategic imbalance in nukes, whilst maintain massive conventional superiority in Europe?
We had a 17:1 advantage overall in nuclear yield (and what most at the time would have described as first-strike capability), and we had local conventional superiority in the Caribbean. Kennedy had the luxury of doing anything he liked, and he decided to paint Krushchev into a corner immediately, giving him no honorable way out. People like to say that Krushchev thought that Kennedy was weak, since he spoke firmly to him in Vienna in 1961, but Sov accounts maintain that Krushchev was very impressed with Kennedy and knew he was a strong leader who couldn't be bullied. Kennedy took the Cuban missiles personally, and he made an impulsive and dangerous response. Krushchev's only "crime" was in telling Kennedy during the summer that he wouldn't put missiles in Cuba, then doing it in the fall.
Not going to touch your last querey, since at best it seems a silly rhetorical.
A lot of people on the inside back then claimed we were a lot closer to WW3 then was reported. However had Kennedy went with diplomacy, no doubt Kruschev would have demanded removal of most of our Nukes in Western Europe which would have made us weaker and no doubt prompted more agressive proliferation by the Soviets. I think it was the right move not just because the missiles were removed from Cuba but also it allowed us to isolate the Soviets further and break their economy.
What timeframe are you referring to when we "broke" the Soviet economy? Their economy didn't reach the point of being unable to sustain the cold war until over three decades post the Cuban missile crisis.
I don't have much of an issue with keeping the pressure on until the last of the thugs are out of there
Always have had mixed feelings on the subject. Bay of Pigs or not, Castro letting Khrushchev bring in nukes was an unforgivable offense. That crazy former Giants prospect almost got us? (who were alive at the time) killed. But at the same time, the embargo never really worked and made an convenient excuse for why their standard of living sucked. Furthermore, in spite of there being a large number of Vietnamese and Chinese Americans living on the left coast, an embargo of China or Vietnam in perpetuity wouldn't get one more EC votes.
Why?
Seeking Soviet aid post Bay of Pigs was a logical move to preserve their regime. But how did Castro think we were going to respond? Did he envision that US intelligence wouldn't figure out what was going on and that we would just let them finish up the deployment of the missiles? Yes, after the fact Cuba got the guarantee of no US invasion (and Soviets got the our? missiles out of Turkey) so the gamble worked in hindsight, but it was hardly a forgone conclusion that the crisis could be resolved without WWIII. It was that recklessness that to me was "unforgiveable". Why couldn't a bunch of conventional Soviet military aid been enough to deter a US invasion?
Maybe for similar reasons that we ringed the USSR with nuclear bombers and Titan missiles to deter a Soviet invasion?
And yet, no other strategic move during the Cold War took us quite the brink like that one. Quick disclaimer: I still need to read up on the 1980's and stuff like Perhsing II's in Germany (that book's on my list). Cold war arms race was a chicken/egg thing in my view. Do you think without our building up our post 1949 nuclear deterrence we would have kept the Soviets out of Western Europe? Would the USSR still have tried to build the H Bomb if we had held off and taken the advice a Cal physics prof?
Hint: Kennedy didn't have to respond the way he did. Love how he's lauded for ExComm and collegial model of decisionmaking, but then he tells them not to discuss a diplomatic response, so his initial response ends up needlessly backing Krushchev into a corner. Then, later, he completely end-runs them and makes a deal through Bobby/Dobrynin that ends with a poorly-worded agreement that State hated for not being able to vet at the time, and which led us eight years later to Cienfuegos (which shows the value of making a diplomatic response (yeay Nixon), even though by then the Sovs had achieved nominal parity). But yeah, it's all the Sovs' fault for wanting to redress the strategic imbalance by using allies. Sad!
I'm skeptical of the idea that Kennedy's first option should have to been to reach out to Khrushchev to pursue a diplomatic before announcing the blockade. I don't see how this would have caused the Soviets to change course in time. But I'm open to changing my position based on further evidence. I don't know Cienfuegos as well, but seems like there was more time for diplomacy on that one. I am somewhat of a closet Nixon sympathizer so yay.
So why did the Sov's get to piss and moan about strategic imbalance in nukes, whilst maintain massive conventional superiority in Europe?
We had a 17:1 advantage overall in nuclear yield (and what most at the time would have described as first-strike capability), and we had local conventional superiority in the Caribbean. Kennedy had the luxury of doing anything he liked, and he decided to paint Krushchev into a corner immediately, giving him no honorable way out. People like to say that Krushchev thought that Kennedy was weak, since he spoke firmly to him in Vienna in 1961, but Sov accounts maintain that Krushchev was very impressed with Kennedy and knew he was a strong leader who couldn't be bullied. Kennedy took the Cuban missiles personally, and he made an impulsive and dangerous response. Krushchev's only "crime" was in telling Kennedy during the summer that he wouldn't put missiles in Cuba, then doing it in the fall.
Not going to touch your last querey, since at best it seems a silly rhetorical.
@BearsWiin so after further research, I'm willing to grant that perhaps Kennedy should have tried the diplomatic approach first- i.e., inform the Soviets immediately that we knew about the missile sites and try to negotiate a deal with removal of the Jupiters from Turkey and no invasion pledge. Would have cost Kennedy some Tuff Cold Warrior "credibility", which we? were obsessed with at the time (and was arguable overrated in the big scheme of things). And it might not have worked. For example, what if Khrushchev made the price of removal a lot higher than what were willing to pay- e.g., demanding that we remove all of our intermediate range missiles from Europe. What does seem clear is that while missiles in Cuba wouldn't have changed have changed the overall strategic nuke balance all that much (Kennedy's team admitted as much), it was a politically impossibility for a US president to allow them to remain. I've always wondered what ExComm would have recommended at the time, where it know that the Soviets already had tactial nukes on the Island to repel a Chinvasion.
If you disclose to the public this concession on my part, I will deny it completely and abrogate the deal.
I don't have much of an issue with keeping the pressure on until the last of the thugs are out of there
Always have had mixed feelings on the subject. Bay of Pigs or not, Castro letting Khrushchev bring in nukes was an unforgivable offense. That crazy former Giants prospect almost got us? (who were alive at the time) killed. But at the same time, the embargo never really worked and made an convenient excuse for why their standard of living sucked. Furthermore, in spite of there being a large number of Vietnamese and Chinese Americans living on the left coast, an embargo of China or Vietnam in perpetuity wouldn't get one more EC votes.
Why?
Seeking Soviet aid post Bay of Pigs was a logical move to preserve their regime. But how did Castro think we were going to respond? Did he envision that US intelligence wouldn't figure out what was going on and that we would just let them finish up the deployment of the missiles? Yes, after the fact Cuba got the guarantee of no US invasion (and Soviets got the our? missiles out of Turkey) so the gamble worked in hindsight, but it was hardly a forgone conclusion that the crisis could be resolved without WWIII. It was that recklessness that to me was "unforgiveable". Why couldn't a bunch of conventional Soviet military aid been enough to deter a US invasion?
Maybe for similar reasons that we ringed the USSR with nuclear bombers and Titan missiles to deter a Soviet invasion?
And yet, no other strategic move during the Cold War took us quite the brink like that one. Quick disclaimer: I still need to read up on the 1980's and stuff like Perhsing II's in Germany (that book's on my list). Cold war arms race was a chicken/egg thing in my view. Do you think without our building up our post 1949 nuclear deterrence we would have kept the Soviets out of Western Europe? Would the USSR still have tried to build the H Bomb if we had held off and taken the advice a Cal physics prof?
Hint: Kennedy didn't have to respond the way he did. Love how he's lauded for ExComm and collegial model of decisionmaking, but then he tells them not to discuss a diplomatic response, so his initial response ends up needlessly backing Krushchev into a corner. Then, later, he completely end-runs them and makes a deal through Bobby/Dobrynin that ends with a poorly-worded agreement that State hated for not being able to vet at the time, and which led us eight years later to Cienfuegos (which shows the value of making a diplomatic response (yeay Nixon), even though by then the Sovs had achieved nominal parity). But yeah, it's all the Sovs' fault for wanting to redress the strategic imbalance by using allies. Sad!
I'm skeptical of the idea that Kennedy's first option should have to been to reach out to Khrushchev to pursue a diplomatic before announcing the blockade. I don't see how this would have caused the Soviets to change course in time. But I'm open to changing my position based on further evidence. I don't know Cienfuegos as well, but seems like there was more time for diplomacy on that one. I am somewhat of a closet Nixon sympathizer so yay.
So why did the Sov's get to piss and moan about strategic imbalance in nukes, whilst maintain massive conventional superiority in Europe?
We had a 17:1 advantage overall in nuclear yield (and what most at the time would have described as first-strike capability), and we had local conventional superiority in the Caribbean. Kennedy had the luxury of doing anything he liked, and he decided to paint Krushchev into a corner immediately, giving him no honorable way out. People like to say that Krushchev thought that Kennedy was weak, since he spoke firmly to him in Vienna in 1961, but Sov accounts maintain that Krushchev was very impressed with Kennedy and knew he was a strong leader who couldn't be bullied. Kennedy took the Cuban missiles personally, and he made an impulsive and dangerous response. Krushchev's only "crime" was in telling Kennedy during the summer that he wouldn't put missiles in Cuba, then doing it in the fall.
Not going to touch your last querey, since at best it seems a silly rhetorical.
A lot of people on the inside back then claimed we were a lot closer to WW3 then was reported. However had Kennedy went with diplomacy, no doubt Kruschev would have demanded removal of most of our Nukes in Western Europe which would have made us weaker and no doubt prompted more agressive proliferation by the Soviets. I think it was the right move not just because the missiles were removed from Cuba but also it allowed us to isolate the Soviets further and break their economy.
What timeframe are you referring to when we "broke" the Soviet economy? Their economy didn't reach the point of being unable to sustain the cold war until over three decades post the Cuban missile crisis.
It wasn't until the 80's until that happened. My point is that had we negotiated with Kruschev on this and pulled back some of our arms in Western Europe, as I believe would have been a demand, we may have never reached that point. It could still be going on as the old Cold War even now.
I don't have much of an issue with keeping the pressure on until the last of the thugs are out of there
Always have had mixed feelings on the subject. Bay of Pigs or not, Castro letting Khrushchev bring in nukes was an unforgivable offense. That crazy former Giants prospect almost got us? (who were alive at the time) killed. But at the same time, the embargo never really worked and made an convenient excuse for why their standard of living sucked. Furthermore, in spite of there being a large number of Vietnamese and Chinese Americans living on the left coast, an embargo of China or Vietnam in perpetuity wouldn't get one more EC votes.
Why?
Seeking Soviet aid post Bay of Pigs was a logical move to preserve their regime. But how did Castro think we were going to respond? Did he envision that US intelligence wouldn't figure out what was going on and that we would just let them finish up the deployment of the missiles? Yes, after the fact Cuba got the guarantee of no US invasion (and Soviets got the our? missiles out of Turkey) so the gamble worked in hindsight, but it was hardly a forgone conclusion that the crisis could be resolved without WWIII. It was that recklessness that to me was "unforgiveable". Why couldn't a bunch of conventional Soviet military aid been enough to deter a US invasion?
Maybe for similar reasons that we ringed the USSR with nuclear bombers and Titan missiles to deter a Soviet invasion?
And yet, no other strategic move during the Cold War took us quite the brink like that one. Quick disclaimer: I still need to read up on the 1980's and stuff like Perhsing II's in Germany (that book's on my list). Cold war arms race was a chicken/egg thing in my view. Do you think without our building up our post 1949 nuclear deterrence we would have kept the Soviets out of Western Europe? Would the USSR still have tried to build the H Bomb if we had held off and taken the advice a Cal physics prof?
Hint: Kennedy didn't have to respond the way he did. Love how he's lauded for ExComm and collegial model of decisionmaking, but then he tells them not to discuss a diplomatic response, so his initial response ends up needlessly backing Krushchev into a corner. Then, later, he completely end-runs them and makes a deal through Bobby/Dobrynin that ends with a poorly-worded agreement that State hated for not being able to vet at the time, and which led us eight years later to Cienfuegos (which shows the value of making a diplomatic response (yeay Nixon), even though by then the Sovs had achieved nominal parity). But yeah, it's all the Sovs' fault for wanting to redress the strategic imbalance by using allies. Sad!
I'm skeptical of the idea that Kennedy's first option should have to been to reach out to Khrushchev to pursue a diplomatic before announcing the blockade. I don't see how this would have caused the Soviets to change course in time. But I'm open to changing my position based on further evidence. I don't know Cienfuegos as well, but seems like there was more time for diplomacy on that one. I am somewhat of a closet Nixon sympathizer so yay.
So why did the Sov's get to piss and moan about strategic imbalance in nukes, whilst maintain massive conventional superiority in Europe?
We had a 17:1 advantage overall in nuclear yield (and what most at the time would have described as first-strike capability), and we had local conventional superiority in the Caribbean. Kennedy had the luxury of doing anything he liked, and he decided to paint Krushchev into a corner immediately, giving him no honorable way out. People like to say that Krushchev thought that Kennedy was weak, since he spoke firmly to him in Vienna in 1961, but Sov accounts maintain that Krushchev was very impressed with Kennedy and knew he was a strong leader who couldn't be bullied. Kennedy took the Cuban missiles personally, and he made an impulsive and dangerous response. Krushchev's only "crime" was in telling Kennedy during the summer that he wouldn't put missiles in Cuba, then doing it in the fall.
Not going to touch your last querey, since at best it seems a silly rhetorical.
A lot of people on the inside back then claimed we were a lot closer to WW3 then was reported. However had Kennedy went with diplomacy, no doubt Kruschev would have demanded removal of most of our Nukes in Western Europe which would have made us weaker and no doubt prompted more agressive proliferation by the Soviets. I think it was the right move not just because the missiles were removed from Cuba but also it allowed us to isolate the Soviets further and break their economy.
What timeframe are you referring to when we "broke" the Soviet economy? Their economy didn't reach the point of being unable to sustain the cold war until over three decades post the Cuban missile crisis.
It wasn't until the 80's until that happened. My point is that had we negotiated with Kruschev on this and pulled back some of our arms in Western Europe, as I believe would have been a demand, we may have never reached that point. It could still be going on as the old Cold War even now.
That's some weird hokey grasping simplistic hypothetical path-dependence bullshit there
Please to be reading Sestanovich's "Did The West Undo The East?" twice, think about it, sleep on it, then read it again before even considering posting on this subject again
And I read Sestanovich back in the day, He could fill some pages but his narrative was slow and often himself relied on hypotheticals. He was nothing special.
And I read Sestanovich back in the day, He could fill some pages but his narrative was slow and often himself relied on hypotheticals. He was nothing special.
Look, it's some friendly advice to help you be less ignorant. Not surprising, however, that you won't heed it.
And I read Sestanovich back in the day, He could fill some pages but his narrative was slow and often himself relied on hypotheticals. He was nothing special.
Look, it's some friendly advice to help you be less ignorant. Not surprising, however, that you won't heed it.
One man's friendly advice is another man's continued pattern of arrogant douchery I suppose.
And I read Sestanovich back in the day, He could fill some pages but his narrative was slow and often himself relied on hypotheticals. He was nothing special.
Look, it's some friendly advice to help you be less ignorant. Not surprising, however, that you won't heed it.
One man's friendly advice is another man's continued pattern of arrogant douchery I suppose.
And I read Sestanovich back in the day, He could fill some pages but his narrative was slow and often himself relied on hypotheticals. He was nothing special.
Look, it's some friendly advice to help you be less ignorant. Not surprising, however, that you won't heed it.
One man's friendly advice is another man's continued pattern of arrogant douchery I suppose.
But, thanks???
I have little patience with people who loudly and proudly proclaim their ignorance. It's a failing of mine, I know, but I'm OK with it.
If you want me to be nicer to you, then don't post stupid shit.
Comments
I prefer my Cohibas STD-free.
Not going to touch your last querey, since at best it seems a silly rhetorical.
Winners win.
If you disclose to the public this concession on my part, I will deny it completely and abrogate the deal.
Please to be reading Sestanovich's "Did The West Undo The East?" twice, think about it, sleep on it, then read it again before even considering posting on this subject again
And I read Sestanovich back in the day, He could fill some pages but his narrative was slow and often himself relied on hypotheticals. He was nothing special.
But, thanks???
Then again, everyone is.
If you want me to be nicer to you, then don't post stupid shit.