Welcome to the Hardcore Husky Forums. Folks who are well-known in Cyberland and not that dumb.
Why Steve Kerr's Small Ball Was the Check Mate Move of the Finals
Tequilla
Member Posts: 19,882
For you fucko's that don't understand basketball, listen up:
The NBA Finals this year is all about driving pace. Cleveland has the best player. The Warriors have the better depth and talent across the roster. When you are the least talented team (and in this case, decidedly so), the Cavs rightfully tried to control tempo, shorten the game, and limit possessions. Through 3 games, this worked.
During Game 3, Golden State discovered through playing David Lee that the key to unlocking Cleveland's defense and creating better tempo for their offense was having 5 guys on the court that could be threats to not only score the basketball, but also move the ball to an open shooter.
Cleveland's injuries have turned it's roster into very much a what you see is what you get squad. It has 2 bigs, the best player in the world, and a bunch of mediocre role players on the perimeter. There's not that much that they can change in terms of what they are doing.
The Warriors "gambled" that going small would fix the tempo issues that they had and given last night's results, other than a few small bursts by the Cavs (7-0 run to open the game and the 3rd quarter), the Cavs looked outclassed and without answers. Why was that? The answers lie as much in what they are able to do offensively as what they were able to do defensively.
1) When Cleveland has both Thompson and Mozgov on the court against the Warriors small ball lineup, they have to guard wing players that are adept at not only shooting jumpers as they are getting to the basket. The lack of desire, particularly by Mozgov, to come away from the hoop leads to warm up jumpers. Last night, you saw on a couple of instances GS players step into mid-range shots knowing that there was no threat from the defense. For players struggling from the floor, knowing that you're going to get uncontested looks helps your confidence. The other side of this equation is ...
2) Should Thompson and Mozgov be more aggressive on the perimeter playing defense or Cleveland go small to match, it opens up lanes and angles for Curry/Thompson to get to the basket. When combined with the above, knowing that Cleveland isn't going to either help off of Curry/Thompson or compromise it's defense to the point where Curry/Thompson are able to take advantage of inferior players 1 on 1, the Warriors have created a situation where they can not only guarantee that they are going to get great looks almost every possession, but also simplify the game in a way that limits their turnovers.
3) Defensively, outside of Curry, the starting lineup for the Warriors last night consisted of various wing players that range from 6'6" to 6'8". This allows them to be far more fluid in their rotations and liberal switching, particularly in the screen/roll game with LBJ. While it opens them up to being potentially hurt on the boards, the benefits are worth it because ...
4) Given the obvious size problems, it forces Cleveland into trying to decide whether or not their best option to score is LBJ going 1 on 1 all the time or trying to take advantage of guys like Mozgov having 6 inches on their defender around the basket. While Mozgov had a huge game last night, his lack of ability to move the ball made it far easier for the Warriors to play a far more active defense and not have to worry about the perimeter players getting on a roll and making a ton of 3's (which is the recipe for any LBJ team when they are at their best).
5) The most subtle change made during the game that was a direct result of the Warriors playing smaller was what they did to LBJ as he wasted away the shot clock. Knowing that LBJ does not want to play with a quick tempo, the Warriors are content to let him dribble for 16 to 18 seconds of the shot clock before either coming with a double, faking the double, or just in general collapsing and limiting his lanes to score. By coming late, it limits not only the amount of time that the Warriors are in a scramble situation defensively trying to get out to shooters, but it is also becomes much more predictable where the rotations need to go. Normally when LBJ penetrates or posts up, he's able to create open shots for his perimeter players. Last night, almost every shot out of those situations was contested. Essentially, what the Warriors are doing is using the Cavs desire to slow the pace against them since their offense has become extremely predictable. The way for the Cavs to attack what the Warriors are doing defensively at this point is to speed up their attack and hit the Warriors EARLIER in the shot clock. The problem with this though is that not only does it expose the Cavs lack of depth by playing a more up and down game, but the pace of going up and down is EXACTLY what a team that is built on offensive efficiency thrives upon. This is essentially the check mate move for the Cavs.
The rest of this series is simple. The Cavs will have better energy on Sunday. LBJ I expect will put up another sizable game. The Warriors will need to hit open shots that they are given (notably Iguodala, Barnes, and Green). If those Warriors in particular are shooting at a high percentage, the Cavs have ZERO answer. They can't go smaller and match. They can't go any bigger. They can't go faster because it exposes their depth. They can't go slower because doing so telegraphs to the Warriors the offense.
At the highest level of professional sports, you want to be in the position where you are playing a winner's game instead of a loser's game. This series is at a point now where the Warriors control who wins or loses. The Cavs only control their effort level and putting themselves in a position to win should the Warriors give them the opportunity to do so.
TL, DR version: TSIO ... Warriors in 6.
The NBA Finals this year is all about driving pace. Cleveland has the best player. The Warriors have the better depth and talent across the roster. When you are the least talented team (and in this case, decidedly so), the Cavs rightfully tried to control tempo, shorten the game, and limit possessions. Through 3 games, this worked.
During Game 3, Golden State discovered through playing David Lee that the key to unlocking Cleveland's defense and creating better tempo for their offense was having 5 guys on the court that could be threats to not only score the basketball, but also move the ball to an open shooter.
Cleveland's injuries have turned it's roster into very much a what you see is what you get squad. It has 2 bigs, the best player in the world, and a bunch of mediocre role players on the perimeter. There's not that much that they can change in terms of what they are doing.
The Warriors "gambled" that going small would fix the tempo issues that they had and given last night's results, other than a few small bursts by the Cavs (7-0 run to open the game and the 3rd quarter), the Cavs looked outclassed and without answers. Why was that? The answers lie as much in what they are able to do offensively as what they were able to do defensively.
1) When Cleveland has both Thompson and Mozgov on the court against the Warriors small ball lineup, they have to guard wing players that are adept at not only shooting jumpers as they are getting to the basket. The lack of desire, particularly by Mozgov, to come away from the hoop leads to warm up jumpers. Last night, you saw on a couple of instances GS players step into mid-range shots knowing that there was no threat from the defense. For players struggling from the floor, knowing that you're going to get uncontested looks helps your confidence. The other side of this equation is ...
2) Should Thompson and Mozgov be more aggressive on the perimeter playing defense or Cleveland go small to match, it opens up lanes and angles for Curry/Thompson to get to the basket. When combined with the above, knowing that Cleveland isn't going to either help off of Curry/Thompson or compromise it's defense to the point where Curry/Thompson are able to take advantage of inferior players 1 on 1, the Warriors have created a situation where they can not only guarantee that they are going to get great looks almost every possession, but also simplify the game in a way that limits their turnovers.
3) Defensively, outside of Curry, the starting lineup for the Warriors last night consisted of various wing players that range from 6'6" to 6'8". This allows them to be far more fluid in their rotations and liberal switching, particularly in the screen/roll game with LBJ. While it opens them up to being potentially hurt on the boards, the benefits are worth it because ...
4) Given the obvious size problems, it forces Cleveland into trying to decide whether or not their best option to score is LBJ going 1 on 1 all the time or trying to take advantage of guys like Mozgov having 6 inches on their defender around the basket. While Mozgov had a huge game last night, his lack of ability to move the ball made it far easier for the Warriors to play a far more active defense and not have to worry about the perimeter players getting on a roll and making a ton of 3's (which is the recipe for any LBJ team when they are at their best).
5) The most subtle change made during the game that was a direct result of the Warriors playing smaller was what they did to LBJ as he wasted away the shot clock. Knowing that LBJ does not want to play with a quick tempo, the Warriors are content to let him dribble for 16 to 18 seconds of the shot clock before either coming with a double, faking the double, or just in general collapsing and limiting his lanes to score. By coming late, it limits not only the amount of time that the Warriors are in a scramble situation defensively trying to get out to shooters, but it is also becomes much more predictable where the rotations need to go. Normally when LBJ penetrates or posts up, he's able to create open shots for his perimeter players. Last night, almost every shot out of those situations was contested. Essentially, what the Warriors are doing is using the Cavs desire to slow the pace against them since their offense has become extremely predictable. The way for the Cavs to attack what the Warriors are doing defensively at this point is to speed up their attack and hit the Warriors EARLIER in the shot clock. The problem with this though is that not only does it expose the Cavs lack of depth by playing a more up and down game, but the pace of going up and down is EXACTLY what a team that is built on offensive efficiency thrives upon. This is essentially the check mate move for the Cavs.
The rest of this series is simple. The Cavs will have better energy on Sunday. LBJ I expect will put up another sizable game. The Warriors will need to hit open shots that they are given (notably Iguodala, Barnes, and Green). If those Warriors in particular are shooting at a high percentage, the Cavs have ZERO answer. They can't go smaller and match. They can't go any bigger. They can't go faster because it exposes their depth. They can't go slower because doing so telegraphs to the Warriors the offense.
At the highest level of professional sports, you want to be in the position where you are playing a winner's game instead of a loser's game. This series is at a point now where the Warriors control who wins or loses. The Cavs only control their effort level and putting themselves in a position to win should the Warriors give them the opportunity to do so.
TL, DR version: TSIO ... Warriors in 6.
Comments
GS also seemed to run more doubles at Lebron and he proceeded to pass more. He only put up 22 shots yesterday, after putting up 35-40 in the first 3gqmes. Cleveland got some good looks for their secondary guys and a shit ton of offensive rebounds...but they missed a lot of them. I think Cleveland has another move in them and will adjust. Checkmate is hyperbole.
I'd love to hear what you think that they can do.
It's fairly clear to anybody that knows basketball that there's only so much Cleveland can do in this series. Their biggest adjustment from Game 4 to Game 5 will simply be to play better.
*Lebron getting back to attacking and putting up 35+ shots, instead of 22, especially if D Lee is at center.
*Jr Smith shooting better than 2-12. He can get very hot especially if GSW concedes open looks when it runs doubles at Lebron
*Mozgov and Thompson convert more Orebs if GS goes small.
I think GSW wins, but hyperbole to say Checkmate. That's Skip Bayless level nonsense.
1) Why did LBJ shoot less? Was that something he did or something that GS forced? If GS forced it, how can LBJ remedy that? In particular, how can LBJ remedy that while also draining the shot clock as illustrated in my original post?
2) No question that JR Smith needs to shoot better. There's a ying and yang with him though. For every great shot that he makes he's bound to take 2-3 where you're scratching your head. They could desperately use one of his 6 to 8 3 point games right now where he's making crazy shots. Outside of LBJ, he's the only guy right now on the floor for Cleveland that has any hope of creating and making tough shots.
3) Mozgov and Thompson aren't high level scorers. Mozgov had a great Game 4. Hard to expect that he'll play much better. Those 2 combined aren't going to miraculously score 50 points combined.
4) You've never once addressed the fact that the changes that Cleveland needs to make are also tied into them needing to play faster ... which goes right into the Warriors hand. That's the check mate standpoint. Any adjustment that Cleveland makes at this point plays into the Warriors hands.
I do expect that Cleveland will be better. But at the same time there's room for the Warriors to be better. It would not shock me to see this series end up very similar to the Memphis series where after being up 2-1 the Grizz were flat out run off the court the next 3 games.
The Warriors have a better team. The Cavs have the best player.
If Cleveland shoots better and attacks doubles better they won't get in a huge deficit in the second half and can control tempo better. Likewise if GSW comes out on fire and builds an early lead they'll control the tempo and Cleveland is fucked, most likely.
Either way...
It's easy to point to LBJ not shooting as much and put it on him.
What I saw last night was GS baiting the Cavs into doing a lot of things to get away from either LBJ dominating the ball and/or not even respecting certain things that LBJ would do knowing that his entire plan was to get late into the shot clock.
For instance, how many times last night did the Warriors blatantly go under screens early in the shot clock with absolutely no regard for LBJ taking a relatively early in the clock shot? They will gladly trade an earlier shot from James if it means speeding up the tempo.
Golden State had open shooters in the first 3 games. They missed shots. Cavs had open shooters in game 4. They missed shots.
If Igoudala scores his average instead of his season high it's a different game. If JR Smith goes 3 for 7 from 3 instead of 0 for 7 it's a different game.
This is all a mute point anyways. Lebron's going for 50 in game 5. Cavs in 4.
Too often I think we fall into the trap of thinking that the MVP means best player ... it's really a combination of who had the best year on a contending team (at least 81% of the time).
MVP has been fucktarded like that for awhile. Jordan only won the MVP 5x in his career when he was far and away the best player in the NBA for 8 to 10 years. Shaq was a lazy fat fuck, but he deserved more than one career MVP.
All that is needed is for the hand (arm bar) check to be called and Iggy is on the bench with 2 fouls in the first 2 minutes and there goes the small ball lineup.
Our Cavs (shout out to APAG) are not done yet. And I don't need 5 million words to tell you why.
Lebron
On the surface, this was the ultimate “make or miss” game. Golden State nailed 24 of 45 uncontested shots, according to NBA.com. Harrison Barnes and Andre Iguodala nailed the open corner 3s they had missed in prior games, and Draymond Green coaxed in a few of those floaters Timofey Mozgov had previously obliterated — including a ferocious chest-to-chest and-1 in the second quarter.
The Cavs, meanwhile, went a frigid 6-of-29 on uncontested looks, emboldening the Warriors to take an extra step away from Matthew Dellavedova and Iman Shumpert in order to squeeze LeBron James.
Golden State coaches and officials were adamant after the game that going smaller had reinvigorated the team. The Warriors felt like themselves again, scrambling around the floor on defense, scrapping for gang rebounds — Green says the team’s guards are more attentive when they know he’s the only big man under the rim — and at least trying to rush the ball up the floor.
“Our competitive level was higher,” Kerr told me outside the Warriors locker room. “It was, ‘Holy shit, this is the NBA Finals, and we better start playing every possession like it’s our last.’”
He added, laughing: “It only took four games. I think when you compete like that, the ball tends to go in more. There is karma in this game.”
The path to those open looks was cleaner without Andrew Bogut and Festus Ezeli around to clog the lane. Mozgov was there, straying far from Iguodala, but that’s still just one body instead of both Mozgov and Bogut hanging around. When Stephen Curry dished to Green on the pick-and-roll, Green caught the ball with acres of open space in front of him — ideal for making clean reads. He dished to Barnes in the right corner here:
DRAYMONDG4
The starting lineup might have flailed around, but small-ball groups with Shaun Livingston played nearly half the game, and they scorched the tired Cavs. The floor gets tight when the Warriors play Livingston, Iguodala, and a traditional center; going super-small, with Green at center, is a way to get their two shaky-shooting Swiss army knives out there together — without killing their spacing.
“The strategy may have helped,” Kerr says. “The whole point is obviously to space the floor. But more than anything, it was just us competing.”
Golden State laid the groundwork in the first half of Game 3. It managed only 37 points in that half, but you could see the offense starting to steady itself — and adding the dashes of in-the-moment cleverness that can make the Warriors so hard to guard. Thompson and Curry do-si-doed under the rim, twirling Cleveland defenders into a daze before rocketing around screens on either side of the floor. The coaches scripted in actions in which Thompson screened for Curry up top and then immediately flew behind another screen for a Golden State big — actions that caught the Cavs off guard in Games 3 and 4:
Game 3- 4
The Cavs closed most of the gaps in Game 3, but not all of them, and the Warriors were confident they could crack them open a bit wider if they stuck with it — especially once they decided to bench Bogut, spread the floor, and drag Mozgov one step further out of his comfort zone.
I mean, look at everything going on here:
Game 4-1
Curry loses Dellavedova on a Barnes pin-down, but instead of searching out his own shot, he leverages the advantage by sprinting into a pick for Livingston. That catches the Cavs off guard, allowing Livingston to drive and find David Lee. Sometimes the most powerful screener is the guy everyone expects to shoot.
“That’s us,” Livingston told me when I asked him about the play as he left the locker room. “At least, tonight it was. That was a smart read by Steph. He knows they are locked on him. They don’t want him to beat them by himself.”
Kerr anticipated that Mozgov would ignore Iguodala when any other Warrior had the ball, so he made sure Iguodala remained an active part of the offense. When Iguodala caught Mozgov drifting toward the rim, he would rush to set a pick for Curry — forcing Mozgov to scurry behind him and try to contain Curry at the 3-point arc. That’s dicey territory for the big fella, and Curry was able to thread pocket passes to Iguodala — leaving Iguodala to slice up the defense in the 4-on-3s Golden State had thrived in until this series.
CURRYIGGY1
CURRYIGGY2
If the Cavs keep Mozgov on Iguodala, the Warriors would do well to expand Iguodala’s role even further — let him run pick-and-rolls, push the ball in transition, and perhaps even try to take Mozgov one-on-one.
Curry didn’t go nova last night, but he found the right balance between passing out of double-teams and hunting for his own shot. He split some traps on drives to the rim, and he attacked Dellavedova one-on-one without the aid of any pick. And, holy hell, did Curry punish the few switches he generated on the pick-and-roll. He nailed step-back 3s over Tristan Thompson and James Jones, and it’s clear now that switching a big onto Curry is untenable. It is merely the moment before fire.
The Warriors have nurtured an ideology of sharing, cutting, and passing. It’s hard to build that for 100 games, then ask Curry to dial up his selfishness. But Golden State needs the MVP to do that, and he came through in Game 4. “He’s trying to play the way we’re used to playing, but also to navigate when he can create his own,” Bruce Fraser, a Warriors assistant coach, told me before Game 4. “There’s a balance he’s trying to find. You may see more selfishness from him.”
Golden State is also starting to read how the Cavs are helping from unconventional places. On most pick-and-rolls, help defense comes from the weak side — but Cleveland isn’t following those rules. If Klay Thompson is on the weak side, it isn’t helping off of him; it will send help from a less dangerous shooter in a more dangerous position — the strong-side corner, closer to the initial pick-and-roll.
Livingston was ready to make that read the second he caught the ball here:
Game 4-2
“I knew I could make that pass,” Livingston told me. “If [Iguodala] misses that shot, it’s still a great shot for us.”
Livingston played a masterful all-around game, and the Warriors found their spirit against a team that had ground it into dust for three games. We’ll see if it lasts. Kerr knows he is taking a major risk going small against the behemoth Thompson-Mozgov front line. The Cavs rebounded 30 percent of their own misses, and a monstrous 36 percent in the 27 minutes their two bigs shared the floor — a span in which Cleveland was plus-1 overall.
Thompson manhandled Barnes under the rim, and one of these games, the Cavs figure to turn all of those offensive rebounds into more second-chance points. Let’s pause for a second and recognize that the Warriors are leaning on lineups with no one taller than 6-foot-8 to take them home. This is Don Nelson–level crazy, even if these guys all play defense. Green makes Chris Bosh, the center on one small-ball champion, look like Manute Bol. “I don’t know if this is gonna work the whole series,” Kerr told me. “But it was a good effort tonight, and now we reshuffle the deck.”
The Cavaliers couldn’t sustain their defense for the full game, but they brought it in spurts — especially at the start of the third quarter, when they denied passes so precisely that Iguodala, holding the ball, simply shrugged his shoulders and jacked two long jumpers he didn’t want to take. With two days off before Game 5, and another potential two-day break before Game 7, perhaps the Cavs can summon the energy to play that way for entire games again.
They’ll need more from their perimeter role players now that Golden State is flashing more urgent help toward James post-ups:
LEBRONHELP
LeBron will fling impossible cross-court passes over and around that extra help, and Cleveland’s shooters will hit more of the 3s those passes produce. The Cavs can help LeBron by setting flare screens off the ball, like the one Shumpert improvised here for Smith (off camera, in the right corner):
FLARE
Shumpert especially needs to seize a more active role. The Cavs cannot gift Curry the chance to hide on Shumpert. When Curry is on Dellavedova, the Cavs pivot right into James/Delly pick-and-rolls; they should use Shumpert more in that same way when Curry is on him.
Cleveland should also keep right on posting up Mozgov against Green, Barnes, and whatever Lilliputian Mozgov encounters. Mozgov has nimble feet, a soft touch, and an angry streak in backing those little dudes all the way under the damn rim. The Warriors mixed in some fronts, even drawing a three-second violation as the Cavs pinged the ball around in search of an open passing angle, but Cleveland shouldn’t shy away from its size advantage.
The Cavs have done periodic damage spotting up Jones as a small-ball power forward around LeBron pick-and-rolls, but it hasn’t been enough to really hurt Golden State, and when Jones is your best small-ball bench option, you’re probably not equipped to beat Golden State in a small-ball series. That is where the Cavs really miss Kyrie Irving to maximize the punch in their small-ball lineups.
But the Cavs, even in this limited state, are equipped to beat the Warriors. They have proven that. They’ll have to do it once more on the road to win what has turned into an intriguing, and potentially epic, NBA Finals.
Some random Game 4 notes as we head back to the Bay:
• Watch the cross-matches in Game 5. Iguodala is guarding James, but the Cavs have James guarding Barnes. The Cavs got two early transition baskets, including a Mozgov dunk, while the Warriors were scrambling around trying to find their proper assignments.
Golden State got one back when Green brought the ball up and found no one guarding him, since his guy, Tristan Thompson, had picked up Iguodala amid the offense-to-defense confusion. These little games-within-the-game can decide things.
• Kerr seems to have concluded that Iguodala is his only workable option on LeBron. When he saw the Cavs insert LeBron early in the second quarter while Iguodala was still on the bench, Kerr immediately burned a 20-second timeout to get Iguodala back in. Kerr confirmed to me afterward that he used the timeout specifically for that purpose, rather than risk even one possession with Barnes on LeBron.
• Kerr didn’t repeat the mistake he made at the end of the first half in Game 3, when he left Ezeli in to guard Jones for the last Cleveland possession. When he saw that the Cavs had inserted Jones, Kerr swapped in Barnes for Lee.
• It’s unclear if James can even come out at this point. The Cavs were minus-6 in the seven minutes James sat, and they have zero offense without him. Their non-LeBron offense resembles how Golden State might look without talent — a bunch of guys running around, cutting, and screening, producing no usable advantage.
• Curry, meanwhile, played the whole second half until garbage time — a huge departure. I loved that.
• The degree to which Golden State is playing Dellavedova to pass on the pick-and-roll, and specifically to toss a lob pass, is getting comical. Both defenders shade toward Tristan Thompson, conceding a floater. Dellavedova nailed three such floaters in Game 3, but he lofted a couple of no-chance-in-hell lobs in Game 4.
• The Cavs’ home gold jerseys swirling around against the Warriors’ road blues is a wonderful visual experience.
• Fun postgame moment: I was in the hallway outside the Warriors locker room, gesturing with my hand to describe a pass one Golden State player had thrown. I stuck my right hand out, and a man passing by at that exact second thought I was reaching for a handshake. He extended his hand to shake mine, realized I had not meant to ask him for a handshake, smiled, and held his hand out until I finally shook it.
It was Usher.
• Usher used a gold microphone to sing the national anthem. Does he always use a gold microphone?
• Actual pregame exchange between Ron Adams and Luke Walton, both Golden State assistants, as Walton walked by Adams on his way to the court:
Adams: “Luke, did you remember to wear deodorant tonight?”
Walton: “Yes.”
Adams: “Good.”
• Curry has an underrated on-court pouting game. He balls up his fists, holds them at waist level, and shakes them as he hops up and down.
• A career highlight: seeing Ric Flair at center court during a commercial break, sporting a trademark Nature Boy robe — Cavs gold, with dark red feather trim. WOOOO!
• They showed my old friend Machine Gun Kelly, the Cleveland-based rapper, on the big scoreboard, and flashed Kelly’s name underneath his face. Michael Strahan was sitting next to him, but the scoreboard operators did not acknowledge him. OH, SNAP! They undid the error a few commercial breaks later, going back to Strahan and giving him the proper treatment.
• Can we move the freaking photographers back a few feet behind the baseline? What is it going to take for this to happen?
• Ice sculptures at big NBA playoff games are officially a thing:
ICE
• A little thing I love about Mozgov’s game: He’s really good at disguising the direction of his pick until the very last moment, and even flipping directions in an instant. He tricked Iguodala a few times on LeBron pick-and-rolls; Iguodala lunged one way, thinking Mozgov’s screen was going to send James in that direction, and fell hopelessly behind when Mozgov set that sucker the other way.
Reminder: Mozgov is under contract for just $4.95 million next season. Cavs GM David Griffin did a sensational job rebuilding this team on the fly during the season.
• I’m always impressed at how quickly teams edit highlights into the pregame montage to pump up the crowd before the introduction of the starting lineups. Tonight’s was filled with clips from Game 3, but the Cavs wisely kept LeBron’s screaming touchdown spike from Game 2 in the anchor spot.
• Speaking of anchor spots: Hurrah for LeBron relishing his place at the end of Cleveland’s lineup introductions. The man gets theater. He waits for the announcer to call his name, rises slowly from his chair, and jogs out — alone, owning the moment.
On to Game 5 …
Sponsored Headlines
1971–1978
The Warriors' last championship was won in 1975.
They renamed themselves the Golden State Warriors for the 1971–72 season, and played almost all their home games in Oakland. Six "home" games were played in San Diego during that season but none were played in San Francisco or Daly City.
The Warriors made the playoffs from 1971 to 1977 except in 1974, and won their only NBA championship on the West Coast in 1974–75. In what many consider the biggest upset in NBA history, Golden State not only defeated the heavily favored Washington Bullets but humiliated them in a four-game sweep. That team was coached by former Warrior Al Attles, and led on the court by Rick Barry, Jamaal Wilkes and Phil Smith. Barry was named MVP of the finals.[8]
1978–1987
Because of the loss of key players such as Barry, Wilkes and Thurmond to trades and retirements, the Warriors struggled to put a competitive team on the court from 1978 to 1987 after being one of the NBA's dominant teams in the 1960s and most of the 1970s. Through the NBA draft, however, they acquired some players such as high-scoring forward Purvis Short (1978), former Purdue University center Joe Barry Carroll (1980) and center Robert Parish (1976), who was traded to the Boston Celtics in 1980 along with the draft pick that would become Kevin McHale for the pick used to draft Carroll. In 1983, the Warriors matched the New York Knicks' offer for free-agent Bernard King, but, unable to pay his high salary, quickly traded him to the Knicks for guard Michael Ray Richardson, whom they soon shipped to New Jersey in exchange for former Georgetown Hoya point guard Eric "Sleepy" Floyd, and journeyman forward Mickey Johnson. (Floyd once scored 29 points for the Warriors in the fourth quarter of a playoff game against the Lakers, though he was later traded to the Houston Rockets).
The departure of these players for various reasons symbolized the franchise's futility during this period, as head coach Attles moved up to the front office as general manager in 1980 and the team made several coaching changes. New owners Jim Fitzgerald and Dan Finane finally managed to return the team to respectability by hiring former Cleveland Cavaliers head coach George Karl as head coach in 1986 after selecting St. John's University sharpshooting small forward Chris Mullin in the 1985 NBA draft.
1987–1997
A ticket for a 1988-89 game between the Warriors and the Jazz.
After a subpar stretch in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the team had a brief resurgence under coach Karl, culminating in a 1987 Western Conference Semifinal match against Magic Johnson and the Los Angeles Lakers which is still shown on TV in the NBA's Greatest Games series. In the game, Warriors' All-Star point guard Sleepy Floyd's performance in the second half still stands as the NBA playoff record for points scored in a quarter (29) and in a half (39). His six consecutive field goals in the fourth quarter led to a 51-point finish for him and a victory for the Warriors.
The "Sleepy Floyd game" was a catalyst for increased interest in the NBA in the Bay Area which was furthered by new coach Don Nelson, who engineered another successful string of wins in the late 1980s and early 1990s with the high-scoring trio of point guard Tim Hardaway, guard Mitch Richmond and forward Chris Mullin (collectively known as "Run TMC" after the rap group Run-D.M.C.). But "Run TMC" stayed together for only two seasons (winning only one playoff series), when coach Nelson, in a move to get a promising young front-court player to complement his run-and-gun system, sent Richmond to the Sacramento Kings for rookie power forward Billy Owens. Nelson had been brought to the Warriors from the Milwaukee Bucks by Jim Fitzgerald, who along with Dan Finnane owned the team between 1986 and 1995. In 1993–94, with first-round draft pick and Rookie of the Year power forward Chris Webber playing alongside off-guard Latrell Sprewell, the Warriors made the playoffs.
Warriors logo (1971-1987)
Warriors logo (1987-1995)
At the start of the next season, however, a rift formed between Webber and Sprewell on the one hand and Nelson on the other. All three soon left the team, and the organization went into a tailspin. 1994–95 was the first season under new team owner Chris Cohan, who had bought out Fitzgerald and Finnane. The Warriors selected power forward prospect Joe Smith as their first overall draft pick in 1995 and hired Rick Adelman as the new head coach. They sent Tim Hardaway and Chris Gatling to the Miami Heat for Kevin Willis and Bimbo Coles midway through the 1995–96 season, and ended up with a 36–46 record, three wins short of making the playoffs. While their home court, the Oakland Coliseum Arena, was being extensively renovated, the 1996–97 Warriors played their home games in the San Jose Arena and struggled to a 30–52 finish.[9]
Longtime Seton Hall college coach P. J. Carlesimo, who had been recently fired by the Portland Trail Blazers, replaced Adelman as head coach for 1997–98. Sprewell was suspended for the remainder of the 1997–98 season for losing his temper and choking Carlesimo during a team practice in December, generating the glaring newspaper headline "WARRIORS HIT ROCK BOTTOM" and the declaration by GM Garry St. Jean that Sprewell would never play for the Warriors again. He would not play in the NBA again until he was dealt in January 1999 to the New York Knicks for John Starks, Chris Mills and Terry Cummings.
1997–2005
St. Jean had become the new Warriors' GM in July 1997; he and his predecessor Dave Twardzik received much of the blame for the Warriors' struggles early in Cohan's turbulent tenure as owner in addition to Cohan himself.[10] St. Jean brought in players such as Terry Cummings, John Starks and Mookie Blaylock who were well past their primes. Twardzik drafted several flops, such as Todd Fuller (while Kobe Bryant was still available as well as Steve Nash and Jermaine O'Neal) and Steve Logan (who never played an NBA game). In the following draft, the team selected Adonal Foyle while Tracy McGrady was still available. St. Jean did, however, draft future two-time NBA slam dunk champion off-guard Jason Richardson (from Michigan State), a Warriors' star scorer through the 2006–07 season.
For a few years, with rising stars Richardson, small forward Antawn Jamison and point guard Gilbert Arenas leading the team, the Warriors seemed like a team on the rise; but the young Warriors did not have enough in the competitive Western Conference to make the playoffs. After the 2002–03 season, St. Jean's earlier mistakes of committing money to players like Danny Fortson, Adonal Foyle and Erick Dampier were painfully felt by Warriors' fans when the team was unable to re-sign Arenas despite his desire to stay in the Bay Area. A new rule was implemented in response to second-round draft picks who quickly become superstars.
2005–2009
Warriors logo 1997–2010
Chris Mullin succeeded St. Jean with the title of Executive Vice President of Basketball Operations in 2004. He hoped to build a winning team around Jason Richardson, Mike Dunleavy Jr and Troy Murphy, and drafted seven-foot center Andris Biedriņš from Latvia (11th overall). At the 2005 trading deadline, he bolstered to the team with the acquisition of point guard Baron Davis, bringing to the team its first superstar since Mullin himself. The Warriors enjoyed a great start to the 2005–06 season, entering the new year with a plus .500 winning percentage for the first time since 1994, but managed to win only 13 more games through the end of March due to injuries. Davis often found himself at odds with new head coach Mike Montgomery (used to dealing with college players in his long tenure at Stanford) and failed to remain healthy, playing in just 54 games. On April 5, 2006, the Warriors were officially eliminated from playoff contention in a 114–109 overtime loss to the Hornets, extending their playoff drought to 12 seasons.
See also: 2006–07 Golden State Warriors season
Entering the 2006–07 season, the Warriors held the active record (12) for the most consecutive seasons without a playoff appearance (see Active NBA non-playoff appearance streaks). During the 2006 off-season, Golden State announced that it had bought out the remaining two years of coach Montgomery's contract and hired previous Golden State and former Dallas Mavericks coach Don Nelson to take over for him. During training camp, small forward Matt Barnes established himself in the rotation. On January 17, 2007, the Warriors traded the disappointing Murphy and Dunleavy with promising young power forward Ike Diogu and Keith McLeod to the Indiana Pacers for forward Al Harrington, forward/guard Stephen Jackson, guard Šarūnas Jasikevičius and forward Josh Powell.[11] This trade allowed the Warriors to "run and gun" their way to the playoffs with a more athletic and talented team. On March 4, 2007, the Warriors suffered a 106–107 loss in Washington, the Wizards handing them their 6th straight loss when former Warrior Arenas hit a technical free throw with less than one second remaining after Nelson had protested a controversial call with the Warriors ahead by a slim margin. The loss dropped them to 26–35, but inspired the team to a point of total determination.
March 4 marked the turning point for the Warriors. The Warriors closed out the regular season (42–40) at 16–5 in their last 21 games.[12] "We Believe" became the Warriors' slogan for the last two months of the season and the playoffs.[13]
Led by a healthy Baron Davis, an ever-improving Jason Richardson and young future star off-guard Monta Ellis as well as center Biedriņš, the Warriors immediately dashed the highly favored top-seed Dallas Mavericks' expectations of a short and easy series win with a Game 1 victory in Dallas thanks to Davis' frantic style of play. The Mavericks came back to win Game 2 easily to tie the series at a game apiece, but the Warriors won both Games 3 & 4 with a huge lift from the home crowd at Oracle Arena. A close Game 5 saw the Mavericks eke out a 118–112 victory with a last-minute surge led by superstar forward Dirk Nowitzki to send the series back to California at 3-2. In Game 6, the Warriors engineered a third-quarter 18–0 run to eliminate the Mavericks and become the NBA's first No. 8 seed to beat a No. 1 seed in a seven-game series (and the first NBA No. 8 seed to beat the top seed since 1999 when the New York Knicks eliminated the Miami Heat). It was an upset in name only, given the fact that the Warriors had swept the Mavericks in the regular season series. The Warriors went on to play the Utah Jazz in the second round of the 2006–07 playoffs, where they dropped two close games at EnergySolutions Arena to open the series. The series then shifted to the Oracle Arena, where the Warriors won Game 3 in a convincing blowout. Davis scored 32 points and electrified the crowd with a monster dunk on Jazz forward Andrei Kirilenko late in the fourth quarter, but they lost Game 4 at home, their first loss in Oakland in well over a month and the Jazz closed them out in Game 5 in Salt Lake City.
The Warriors faced early difficulties in their attempt to return to the playoffs. Richardson was traded to the Charlotte Bobcats for rookie Brandan Wright. To make things even worse, Jackson was suspended for seven games over a firearm incident. They opened the 2007-08 season with six straight losses, but Ellis' rise, Davis' solid injury-free season (21.6 points, 8 assists, 4.6 rebounds per game),[14] and an overall improvement in team chemistry brought them back to playoff contention; but in the end the Warriors were eliminated from the 2008 Western Conference Playoffs despite a 48–34 season, which is the best record in NBA history for a non-playoff team since the NBA playoffs had expanded to eight teams per conference. The Warriors sold out nearly every home game during the season averaging 19,631 per game, the highest in team history.
2008–2011
In the offseason, Baron Davis opted to return to his home town and sign with the Los Angeles Clippers. With the 14th pick of the 2008 NBA draft, the Warriors selected and signed Anthony Randolph out of LSU. To compensate for the loss of Davis, the Warriors signed free agents Corey Maggette and Ronny Turiaf and re-signed Ellis and Andris Biedriņš to long-term contracts.
The Warriors had a disappointing 2008–2009 season, finishing 29–53. Ellis was injured in a moped accident, and suspended for 30 games for riding the vehicle against the terms of his contract, depriving the Warriors of their top player. They traded disenchanted forward Al Harrington to the New York Knicks for guard Jamal Crawford, and were undone by injuries and the minimal experience of their young players such as Anthony Morrow and Brandan Wright. Coach Nelson often had to make adjustments to the starting lineups since many of the original starters missed games due to injuries. Despite the team's losing record, the Warriors were hard to beat when they had a healthy lineup and a strong bench. With leadership and improvement in their young players, they were sometimes able to defeat powerhouse teams such as the Boston Celtics, 99-89.